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Abstract 
To reach the Millennium Development Goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE), developing 
countries have implemented numerous educational policies (United Nations, 2014). Despite the 
remarkable upsurge in schooling in these countries, gender-related inequalities are persistent, 
particularly in levels of attainment. A recent report of United Nations specified that only 23% of 
girls in poor rural households do complete the primary level of education in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2011 (UNESCO, 2014). This dissertation provides three potential explanations for these 
issues: the schooling costs; the school infrastructure; and the household wealth. The first 
explanation relates to the remaining schooling costs. Indeed, policies of removal of school fees 
often neglect that parents also support other kinds of schooling costs. These residual costs are the 
indirect costs and the opportunity costs, which are reasonably high in some developing countries. 
In the case of Benin, a West African country, despite the removal of school fees, the residual 
schooling costs remain high. Thus, the dilemma of which child to send to school is still relevant 
for poor households. The evaluation of the elimination of school fees in Benin provides evidence 
for this argument. The poor quality of schools' infrastructure in developing countries could be a 
second explanation for the gender gap in schooling. The long distances to the closest primary 
school, the large numbers of pupils in the classrooms, the lack of teachers and pedagogical 
materials are all factors that could discourage children―especially girls―in their school 
attendance. The evaluation of a demand-and-supply policy indicates the importance of a removal 
of school costs and the upgrading of the schools’ infrastructure to reduce the gender gap in 
schooling. The third explanation relates to the importance of the household wealth on schooling 
decisions. A policy that eliminates school fees could maintain the dependence of schooling 
decisions on household wealth by neglecting the remaining schooling costs. In such a case, a 
wealth shock could be detrimental to the gender gap in schooling and on the efforts already 
engaged in to reach the goal of UPE. The assessment of the impact of a negative wealth shock on 
children’s schooling and labor in Benin provides empirical evidence for this argument. 
The contributions of this dissertation are both theoretical and empirical. On one hand, this 
research meaningfully extends the literature on impact evaluation in Benin. Crucially, the country 
lacks research studies that evaluate economic policies. On the other hand, the relevance of the 
dissertation also lies in the analysis of the relationship between price and wealth effects. These 
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effects are observed through the reactions of households to wealth or price changes. They 
indicate which policy―based on the schooling price or the household wealth―should be 
prioritized to enhance education in Benin. On the other hand again, the theory of the determinants 
of gender-related differences in schooling is also tested in the articles. Finally, this research uses 
novel methods in the field of impact evaluation with three natural experiments in the case of 
Benin to support the arguments.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Um die Millenniumsentwicklungsziele (MDG) der Grundschulausbildung für alle Kinder 
(MDG2) vor 2015 zu erreichen, haben die Entwicklungsländer zahlreiche bildungspolitische 
Maßnahmen umgesetzt, aber die Ungleichheiten zwischen den Geschlechtern bestehen fort, 
besonders hinsichtlich der Bildungsabschlüsse der Schulleistung. Laut einem kürzlich 
veröffentlichen Bericht der Vereinten Nationen wurde festgestellt, dass nur 23% der Anzahl der 
Mädchen in armen ländlichen Haushalte das Grundbildungsniveau in Afrika südlich der Sahara 
im Jahr 2011 erreiche. Diese Dissertation liefert drei mögliche Erklärungen für diese Probleme: 
die Schulkosten, die Schulinfrastruktur und die Haushaltseinkommen. Die erste Erklärung könnte 
in verbleiben trotz der Abschaffung der Schulgebühren verbleibenden Schulkosten liegen. Beim 
Wegfall der Schulgebühren wird häufig vernachlässigt, dass für Eltern auch andere Kosten als die 
Schulgebühren anfallen, wie indirekte Kosten und , in die in einigen Entwicklungsländern recht 
hoch ausfallen. Dies trifft auf Benin zu. Das Dilemma, welches von mehreren Kindern in die 
Schule geschickt werden soll, ist für arme Haushalte also immer noch relevant. Die  in der 
Dissertation vorgenommene Auswertung zur Abschaffung der Schulgebühren in Benin 
untermauert dieses Argument. Die zweite Erklärung der geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede 
bei der Beschulung könnte in der schlechten Qualität der schulischen Infrastruktur in einigen 
Entwicklungsländern liegen. Die weite Entfernung bis zur nächsten Grundschule, übergroße 
Klassenräume, der Mangel an Lehrern und von Unterrichtsmaterialien sind Faktoren, die Kinder, 
vor allem Mädchen, vom Schulbesuch abhalten könnten. Eine Auswertung zu einer sowohl 
nachfrage- als auch angebotsseitigen Politik zeigt, dass es wichtig ist, sowohl die Schulkosten zu 
beseitigen als auch die schulische Infrastruktur auszubauen, wenn die Kluft zwischen den 
Geschlechtern bei der Beschulung reduziert werden soll. Die dritte Erklärung betrifft die 
Bedeutung der Haushaltseinkommen bei Bildungsentscheidungen. Bei Vernachlässigung der 
verbleibenden Schulkosten könnte im Falle einer Politik der Abschaffung der Schulgebühren die 
Abhängigkeit von Beschulungsentscheidungen durch die Haushaltseinkommen weiterhin 
bestehen. In einem solchen Fall könnte ein Einkommensschock sich nachteilig auf die 
geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede in der Beschulung und die Bemühungen um die Erreichung 
der MDG2 auswirken. Eine Auswertung der Auswirkungen eines negativen Einkommensschocks 
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auf Schulbesuch und Arbeitstätigkeit von Kinder in Benin bietet empirische Evidenz für dieses 
Argument. 
Die Beiträge dieser Arbeit sind theoretisch und empirisch. Diese Forschung erweitert bedeutsam 
das Publikationsaufkommen über Wirksamkeitsevaluation in Benin. Das Land fehlt 
Programmevaluierungsstudien. 
Die Relevanz der Dissertation liegt auch in der Analyse der Beziehung zwischen Preis- und 
Einkommenseffekten. Diese Effekte werden durch die Reaktionen der Haushalte auf 
Einkommens- oder Preisänderungen beobachtet. Dies indiziert, welche politischen Maßnahmen 
basierend auf dem Preis der Beschulung oder dem Haushaltseinkommen für eine Verbesserung 
der Bildung in Benin priorisiert werden sollte. Der Forschungsstand über Bestimmungsfaktoren 
geschlechtsspezifischer Unterschiede der Beschulung war auch Gegenstand der Prüfung in den 
Artikeln der Dissertation. Abschließend werden in der hier vorgelegten Forschung mit drei 
natürliche Experimenten am Fall von Benin neue Verfahren im Bereich der Forschungsstand 
verwendet, um die vorgetragenen Argumente zu unterstützen. 
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Synopsis (Part 1) 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) have been at the leading edge of numerous 
educational policies worldwide (United Nations, 2014). Developing countries were assisted 
through	 important educational investments to reach the goal of Universal Primary Education 
(UPE)1 (Colclough and Al-Samarrai, 2000). From the implementation of the policies, two 
surprising facts can be observed. First, the statistics still indicate a huge percentage of out-of-
school children, girls especially. A recent report of the United Nations stated that 57 million 
children were not enrolled, and half of those were girls in 2011 (UNESCO, 2014). Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) still has some progress to make, with 22% of the population of school-going age 
not registered in primary schools in comparison to other parts of the world in 2011 (UNESCO, 
2014). Second, the children enrolled at school performed poorly and dropped out. In 2010, only 
56% of the population, who began a primary education, actually completed that level of 
education in SSA (UNESCO, 2014). 
 
Background of education in Benin. One SSA country in particular faces similar issues of poor 
attendance in primary school and persistent gender inequalities: Benin. This West African 
country has low rates of enrollment and attendance coupled with critical gender inequalities. In 
1998, the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) was 91.2% for boys and 69.3% for girls (INSAE, 2008). 
The Gross Intake Ratio (GIR) is the number of children registered in the last grade of primary 
education―regardless of age―over the number of children who should be in this last grade 
(UNESCO, 2009). The GIR was 52.2% for boys and 24.8% for girls in 1998 (INSAE, 2008). 
This result indicates that more than double the population of children registered in primary school 
abandoned their schooling before its completion. This situation is even worse for girls. Fewer 
girls access the educational system, and their chances of completing a primary level of education 
are even lower. Surprisingly, these inequalities remain despite the different educational policies 
executed in the country. In 2001, the Benin government declared primary education free of 
charge for girls in rural areas. In 2006, this Free Primary Education (FPE) was extended to all 
																																								 																				
1	Goal number two of the Millennium Development Goals is to achieve Universal Primary Education by 2015.  The 
policies implemented in some Sub-Saharan African countries to reach this goal are called the Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) or Free Primary Education (FPE), depending on the context.	
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children of primary school-going age. The first reform was an elimination of school fees for girls 
in rural areas. The second reform was an essential demand-and-supply side policy, which 
involved the abolition of school fees, the construction of schools and recruitment of teachers. In 
2010, nevertheless, the GER was 114.02% for boys and 108.86% for girls in primary school. For 
the completion of primary education, in 2010, the GIR was 70.35% for boys and 57.30% for girls 
(INSAE, 2012). Despite the progress, it appears that the gender gap in schooling still exists in 
primary schools in Benin. This situation raises one research question, which is the main one: 
What is the impact of the Free Primary Education (FPE) on gender differences in schooling in 
Benin? More specifically, research questions include: 
ü What is the impact of the FPE of 2001 on children’s schooling in Benin, on girls 
especially? 
ü What is the impact of the FPE of 2006 on children’s schooling in Benin, on girls 
especially? 
ü Are the outcomes of these policies (FPE of 2001 and 2006) sustainable in the case of a 
wealth shock? 
 
Conceptual Framework. The research questions of this dissertation investigate the impact of a 
removal of school costs (FPE 2001), a demand-and-supply side policy (FPE 2006) and of a 
wealth shock on girls’ schooling in Benin. These different determinants of schooling decisions 
have been examined in the literature. In particular, in the literature on the economics of education 
three main factors may explain gender-related inequalities: schooling costs; the school’s 
infrastructure; and the household wealth. In developing countries, the gender gap may stem from 
the budget constraints of the household. Two major factors from the budget constraint could 
influence parents in their decision: the schooling costs; and the household wealth. Given the 
restrictions of their budget, parents face the dilemma which child to send to school. According to 
some previous studies, boys are often chosen to send to school to the detriment of girls in SSA 
due to cultural considerations. The literature also indicates that the opportunity costs of schooling 
could be higher for girls than boys (Glick, 2008). Girls are needed to help with domestic chores 
in the households or to take care of newborn babies. This situation may worsen with wealth 
shocks. Priorities may shift from children's schooling to basic food consumption when budget 
constraints become tighter. Girls are likely the first to be dropped out of school to cope with a 
20	
	
wealth shock. Additionally, the school’s infrastructure itself could widen the gender gap. In some 
developing countries, schooling conditions are quite poor. The road to the closest primary school 
is often long and difficult of access, for girls in particular. The empirical literature also showed 
that the negative impact of the distance to school is stronger on girls than boys (Tansel (1997), 
Lloyd et al. (2000)). Many schools lack teachers and basic pedagogical materials, and these poor 
schooling conditions could motivate the choice of parents to keep girls away from schools 
(Birdsall and Orivel (1996), Glick and Sahn (2000), Michaelowa (2001), Glick (2008), Huisman 
and Smits (2009)). Potential ways in which to assist parents in their schooling decisions include 
the reduction of school costs, the improvement of schooling conditions, or the increase of the 
household wealth. In some developing countries, governments can only influence the schooling 
costs and conditions given their own restricted resources. Nevertheless, there are two potential 
issues with the empirical literature on program evaluation. On the one hand, there are only a few 
empirical studies on SSA. On the other hand, the literature diverges on the outcomes of the 
policies, depending on the context. Deininger (2003) shows that in Uganda the UPE drastically 
bettered the enrollment and attendance of children while reducing the gender gap. Other studies 
show that the program also lowered the delayed enrollment in Uganda (Grogran (2009), 
Nishimura et al. (2008)). Lincove (2012) found that poor households are still vulnerable in 
Uganda: although the gender gap has reduced, there are dropouts due to poor wealth. Lucas and 
Mbiti (2012) also found in Kenya that the policy enhanced access to education for boys and girls, 
but boys achieved more in school than girls. In Nigeria, selection into the UPE policy was 
unevenly targeted. Thus, household wealth still influences schooling (Lincove, 2009). Therefore, 
the impact of the UPE policy on schooling may not meet expectations. 
The first argument of this dissertation is that a policy of removal of school fees may have a 
“restricted” impact on attendance―especially for girls―because of the remaining additional 
education costs. The costs of schooling are the direct, indirect and opportunity costs. The direct 
costs are school fees. The indirect costs include transportation costs, uniform fees, and the 
parents-teacher association fees, for example. The opportunity cost is the time the child spends in 
school as an alternative to working to help its family. The policies of elimination of school fees 
usually neglect the indirect and opportunity costs, which are often significant in low-income 
households. As a reduction of school costs, the FPE could encourage parents to enroll their 
children due to the price effect. Indeed, the consumption theory states that a decrease 
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(respectively increase) in the price of a given good leads ceteris paribus to an increase 
(respectively decrease) in the demand for this good, depending on the nature of the good. This is 
the price effect. However, the overall costs of schooling might still be high for some families 
after the removal of the school fees. It could explain the stable rates of attendance and completion 
over the years in Benin. This hypothesis is tested in Chapter 1 with a natural experiment on the 
FPE of 2001. This chapter presents a triple-differences method taking advantage of the 
differences in cohorts, in areas of residence and in time to evaluate the impact of the policy. The 
sensitivity analyses consist of two placebo experiments on non-eligible children and a control for 
potential migration effect.  
The second argument is that a demand-and-supply side policy could reduce the gender gap in 
schooling because it considers more than one determinant of the schooling decisions. The policy 
of the removal of school fees possibly overlooks poor schooling conditions in some developing 
countries. The removal of school fees may encourage enrollment but the overpopulation in 
classrooms or the absence of the teachers can discourage the child from continuing, and this 
could explain the persistence of the gender inequalities in schooling. In contrast to the removal of 
school fees, a demand-and-supply side policy influences the school costs and the schools’ 
infrastructure. Such a policy could be more beneficial for attendance, especially for girls. The 
assumption, is that if girls are negatively more affected by the school costs and the schools’ 
infrastructure than boys, a policy that influence this two factors could have more effects on girls 
than boys. This hypothesis is tested in Chapter 2 with a second natural experiment, the FPE of 
2006. This chapter focuses mainly on the differences in birth cohort in order to evaluate the 
impact of the policy. The sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of the results with a placebo 
experiment. 
The third argument is that a wealth shock could threaten the progress of the reduction of the 
gender gap in schooling. A removal of school fees possibly alleviates households' budget 
constraints. However, the household's income can still play a major role in schooling decisions, 
as long as it remains other schooling costs. One could wonder about the sustainability of these 
educational policies in the case of a wealth shock. The consumption theory specifies that a 
decrease (respectively increase) in income induces ceteris paribus a decrease (respectively 
increase) of consumption. This is the income effect. It is thus possible that parents continue to 
remove children―particularly girls―from school to help cope with a negative income shock. 
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This could also mean that the educational policies that do not consider the household income do 
not provide enough security for schooling, and this could be a valid threat to the realization of the 
UPE. This hypothesis is also tested in Chapter 3 with a natural experiment, discussing a major 
flood that occurred in Benin in 2010. The impact evaluation in this chapter compares schooling 
decisions of farm and non-farm households following the shock. The sensitivity analyses control 
the effects on children in non-farm and non-affected households. These considerations can all be 
summarized in the following conceptual framework: 
 
Conceptual framework   
Legend: 
Source: Based on Wolfe and Behrman (1984), Al-Samarrai and Peasgood (1998), Colclough et al. (2000), 
Glick and Sahn (2000), Birdsall and Orivel (1996), de Janvry et al. (2006), Lincove (2009), Huisman and 
Smits (2009), Grogan  (2009). 
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Contributions of the dissertation. With the three articles, this dissertation makes numerous 
contributions with the research by meaningfully extending the literature on impact evaluation in 
Benin. The country lacks crucially of impact studies on public programs. The dissertation 
highlights the pros and cons of the FPE policies in Benin. The relevance of the dissertation lies in 
the analysis of the relationship between price and income effects; the effects of which are 
observed through the reactions of households to income or price changes. An elimination of 
school fees could cause an improvement in children’s education, which is the price effect. A 
negative income shock could generate a relapse in children’s education, which is the income 
effect. In the particular case of a low-income country, it could be of interest to determine the 
dominant effect. Does the income effect prevail over the price effect? In such a case, an income 
shock―during the implementation of the school fees removal―could result in a decrease in the 
number of children enrolled. Does the price effect overrule the income effect? In this case, an 
income shock―during the implementation of the elimination of school fees―could result in a 
negligible or no influence on children’s education. In any case, it could indicate which 
policy―based on the schooling price for the household income―should be prioritized in order to 
improve education in Benin. The theory of the determinants of gender-related differences in 
schooling is also tested in the articles. The papers enable the analysis of the major role of 
schooling costs and the schools’ infrastructure on household decisions. In contrast, to a demand 
policy, it discloses the benefits of a demand-and-supply side policy on girls’ attendance. The 
dissertation also uses novel methodological models to estimate and check the robustness of the 
results. The articles investigate not only enrollment but also dropout rates and years of schooling 
as schooling outcomes.  
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 1 evaluates the impact of the FPE of 
2001 on girls’ schooling, Chapter 2 measures the impact of FPE of 2006 on girls’ schooling, 
while Chapter 3 assesses the impact of a negative wealth shock on girls’ schooling and labor. 
Chapter 4 concludes. 
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Chapter 1: Short- and Medium-Term Impacts of the Elimination of 
School Fees on Girls’ Schooling in Benin, West Africa 
 
Mafaïzath Fatoké Dato* 
Abstract 
This study measures the impact of the abolition of primary school fees for girls in rural areas 
of Benin, West Africa. The triple difference method has been applied using the National 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 1996, 2001 and 2006, to assess the impact of this 
policy of 2001. The Free Primary Education (FPE) policy increased the probability of enrollment 
of the beneficiaries by 11% in the short-term and 13% in the medium-term. The policy influenced 
educational outcomes of children in all households; the impact was however greater on the 
wealthiest households than on others in the short-term. Furthermore, the FPE has no significant 
impact on the attendance of girls in rural areas in the short or medium-term. These results are 
robust as evidenced by two placebo experiments. In conclusion, the elimination of direct school 
costs may enhance access to education, but has no impact on the attendance of the beneficiaries.   
   
 JEL codes: H43, I24, I25, O15 
Keywords: Impact evaluation, school fees, distance to school, girls’ education, natural 
experiment.  
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1. Introduction 
One subject extensively discussed in the literature is which public policies could reduce the 
gender gap in education in developing countries. Given limited resources, a government must be 
perspicacious in selecting policies that promote education. Some studies provide evidence that 
the enhancement of a school’s infrastructure on the supply side increases achievement. Indeed, 
even a mere redistribution of public resources improves achievement, especially for girls and for 
the poor (Duflo, 2004; Chin, 2005). On the demand side, cash transfers, scholarships and the 
abolition of schooling costs are among other incentives used to encourage children’s education. 
Considering subsidies, a conditional cash transfer influences the enrollment of the recipients, to a 
larger extent for girls than for boys (Schultz, 2004; Schady and Filmer, 2006). Most studies 
indicate that educational policies ― whether gender neutral or not ― enhance girls’ education.  
Specifically, the rationale behind the elimination of costs is that parents may decide not to 
send their children to school due to the lack of sufficient funds. One child could be sent to school 
to the detriment of another considering the marginal benefits and costs of education. This may 
explain the success of gender-targeted policies in cultural contexts that are more challenging for 
girls (Glick, 2008). In most cases, the abolition of school fees culminates in an upsurge in 
enrollment, and reduces gender gaps. However, a change mainly in direct costs may have only a 
“restricted” effect on schooling (Behrman and Knowles, 1999; Behrman and Wolfe, 1984). It 
might be explained by the fact that parents have to pay other indirect educational costs (e.g. 
transportation costs, uniforms fee….). This paper demonstrates that in the case of Benin, West 
Africa, the elimination of school fees improves enrollment, but may not substantially increase the 
average duration of schooling.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, most countries have implemented a Free Primary Education policy 
(FPE) to abolish school fees for school-aged children. Nevertheless, only a few studies have 
assessed these policies in Africa, possibly due to the scarcity of data. Benin is a remarkable 
country for the evaluation of gender-targeted policies. The government launched the 
implementation of FPE for girls living in rural areas in primary school in 2001. Benin was facing 
substantial gender disparities in primary education; enrollment and achievement rates of girls 
lagged behind those of their male counterparts. In 1998, boys’ gross enrollment rate was 91.2% 
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with a promotion rate2 of 52.2%, while girls’ enrollment rate was 59.1% with a promotion rate of 
24.8% in primary schools. Consequently, in 2001, Benin implemented the FPE policy for girls in 
rural areas; the state supported the reform with more subsidies to primary school to enroll girls. 
Nonetheless, discrimination against girls in primary education has been persistent. In 2002, the 
boys’ gross enrollment rate was 103.9%, whereas the girls’ enrollment rate was 76.2% in primary 
schools (INSAE, 2009)3.  
This paper evaluates the impact of the FPE policy on the schooling of girls living in rural areas 
in primary school in the short- and medium-terms. Essentially, it attempts to address one of the 
main criticisms of the impact of evaluations in developing countries, which is the tendency to 
focus on short-term analysis (Duflo, 2004). Hence, the triple differences method has been applied 
using the National Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 1996, 2001 and 2006. The main 
challenges of the evaluation were to find a suitable control group for the beneficiaries and to 
identify the effect of the policy with the number of years of surveys available. In this regard, girls 
in urban areas are the most appropriate control group. Even so, the divergence between rural and 
urban areas could be a major weakness of the estimates. These issues are overcome with 
variations in the cohorts of birth, in the area of residence, and over time.  The treatment group is 
girls living in rural areas and of primary school age. Thus, the girls in older cohorts of birth and 
living in urban areas could be a valid control group. This paper also analyzes the effect of 
distance to school as a proxy for the other educational costs. These costs might also explain 
school attendance. The study also includes two placebo experiments with older cohorts of birth 
and children living in urban areas. Consequently, the impact is measured on a large sample of 
birth cohorts over three years of surveys. An additional robustness check controls for potential 
migration between regions. All these robustness checks support the results of the evaluation.  
The noteworthy aspects of this study are threefold. First, it is one of the first evaluations of the 
FPE in Benin and is a part of the literature on impact evaluation in Africa. Second, the paper 
																																								 																				
2 The promotion rate per grade is the percentage of children per cohort from a given grade and in a given school year 
who actually continued on to the next grade in the following year (UNESCO, 2009). 	
3	All the figures in this paragraph are from the report INSAE (2009). Furthermore, the gross enrollment rate could be 
over 100% because it is irrespective of age. In other words, children who are younger or older than the typical grade 
age level could be included.  
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considers more than one educational outcome, namely current enrollment, dropout4 and years of 
schooling completed. Third, the analyses are of the short- and medium-terms. This assessment of 
FPE could help to improve the policy and to minimize girls’ underachievement. The structure of 
the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents Benin’s implementation of the FPE; Section 3 explains 
the methodology; and Section 4 provides the results of the evaluation. Section 5 presents the 
robustness checks and Section 6 draws the main conclusions. 
 
2. Benin’s implementation of the Free Primary Education policy of 2001 
Article 3 of Benin’s Fundamental Law of December 11, 1990, stated that, “… education is 
mandatory and the State and the communities are responsible for making it progressively free.” 
Hence, within the framework of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, the government 
decided to eliminate school fees for girls in rural areas and in primary education. This measure 
was only relevant for girls in public primary schools, and was implemented at the beginning of 
the academic year5 2000-2001. In 2001, the government provided financial support to primary 
schools to compensate for the elimination of fees. On October 14, 2006, the newly elected 
government6 declared that access to pre-primary and primary education should be free of charge 
for every child of primary school age. However, this study focuses on the first FPE policy 
initiated in 2001. Analysis of the 2006 FPE policy will be the subject of a future study. 
At the time of writing, the statistics on the actual school fees on a national scale were not 
available, thus it was not possible to analyze the decrease in schooling costs. Instead, Figure 1 
presents education expenditure or public spending on education and the gross enrollment rate 
(GER). These statistics suggest that the government made large investments in education in 2001. 
Education expenditure is the amount of financial resources that the government devotes to 
																																								 																				
4	The present study defines school dropouts as children who were registered in primary school, but did not enroll in 
school in the year of the survey. In other words, the variable dropouts refers to the children who had been registered 
in primary school in a given year, but did not complete the primary level of education.	
5	The academic year in Benin runs from October to July. 	
6	Based on the National Report “Impact de la gratuité de l’enseignement maternel et primaire sur la pauvreté, le 
social et les OMD” a 2012 report of the “Observatoire du Changement Social” which is a division of the Benin 
Ministry of Development and Economic Analysis. 
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national education. It is expressed in billions of the local currency, the Franc CFA, which stands 
for Communauté Financière d’Afrique (CFA). The statistics are given at the constant price of 
2006. However, the expenditure includes not only the primary level, but also other levels of 
education. Generally, Benin’s investments in education increased from 35.3 billion CFA in 1992 
to 86 billion CFA in 2006. With regard to the period studied (1996-2006), one of the statistical 
peak amounts of education expenditure, 56.8 billion CFA, took place in 2001, and corresponds to 
the start of the FPE policy for girls living in rural areas. The total includes all levels of education, 
so the amount spent on FPE cannot be directly observed.  
Figure 1: Development of education expenditure and the GER (1992-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education expenditures are given at a constant 2006 price to remove the effect of inflation. 1 
billion CFA= 1,660 million US dollars (on 27/05/2015). 
Source: Statistics from Mondiale (2009) 
 
The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) is the percentage of children registered in primary schools 
expressed in the percentage of the number of children who should be in primary schools.  The 
main disadvantage of this indicator is that it does not take into account the age of the registered 
children. Hence, older or younger children in a cohort of pupils could be included in the statistics. 
The chart on the right of Figure 1 indicates that the growth of the GER is relatively stable.  
This analysis would be incomplete without an examination of girls’ education in Benin. The 
aim of Chart 2 is to provide an overview of enrollment and completion in primary schools per 
gender over the period of study. Figure 2 displays the development of the Gross Intake Ratio 
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(GIR) of primary schools and the completion rate from 1994 to 2005. The GIR is the number of 
children registered in the first grade of primary school (regardless of their age) over the number 
of children who should be enrolled in the first grade of primary school (UNESCO, 2009). It 
reveals the capacity of the system to receive children, and more importantly, the number of 
children who do access the first grade of primary school. The completion rate is the number of 
children from the initial cohort of children registered in the first grade of primary school who 
reached the last grade (UNESCO, 2009). The difference between the GIR and the female GIR is 
that the latter considers only girls. Figure 2 presents a chart illustrating that GIRs increased over 
time. The chart shows the development of the GIR and the completion rate per gender between 
1998 and 2006. 
Figure 2: Development of the gross intake rate and completion rates from 1998 to 2005 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: Based on statistics from INSAE (2009) 
	
Mostly, the male GIR remains higher than the female GIR up to 2003, after which it appears 
that the gender gap might have decreased. Additionally, the completion rate is relatively stable 
during this period. For example, in 2001, 91% of girls entered the first grade, with only 29.9% 
actually completing the primary level. Therefore, the number of school dropouts has only slightly 
changed, and so remains important. Furthermore, the elimination of fees for girls may not affect 
their achievement, which is the primary concern of this paper.  
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3. Methodology  
This section covers the identification strategies, descriptive evidence and estimation procedures. 
 
3.1 Identification strategies 
One main assumption of the DID is the parallel trend between treatment and control groups. 
The assumption states that the outcomes of the treatment and control groups follow parallel 
trends. In this study, the comparison is between the schooling trends of treatment and control 
groups. The comparison of the groups at two different periods is possible because the schooling 
trends are assumed to be parallel. Even if there was a difference in the outcomes of the younger 
and older birth cohorts, due to the previous assumption, any jump in the trend of the treatment 
group is associated with the policy. Also, the regression models include characteristics of the 
groups to consider any additional differences in demographics. Duflo (2004) used a similar 
strategy to evaluate the medium-term impact of an expansion of primary schools in Indonesia. 
Among other strategies, the author compares a younger (about 20 and 40 years old) to an older 
(about 40 and 60 years old) birth cohort. 
The FPE policy aiming at girls’ schooling was implemented in rural areas from 2001 onward. 
This paper examines Benin’s implementation of FPE as a natural experiment. The impact 
evaluation can take advantage of three variations: First, the policy targeted girls in rural areas; a 
comparison can be made between girls living in rural and in urban areas. Second, the FPE policy 
applied to girls in primary school. As a result, only children between six and 11 years old are 
eligible for the program. Hence, a second comparison is possible between younger cohorts of 
children that are of primary school age during the program, and older cohorts of children that are 
of secondary school age. The third comparison is then over time.  
The first comparison of girls in rural and urban areas might be affected by the contrast between 
these areas. In the context of a developing country, rural and urban areas could be different, 
mainly in terms of infrastructure (e.g. number of schools, number of teachers, and the school 
environment in general). The alternative of comparing boys and girls in the same areas might be 
worse. Indeed, households might have a preference for boys’ enrollment, to the detriment of girls. 
The fact that wealth constraints have an impact on a household's decision to enroll a child also 
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cannot be ignored. In that case, a policy that affects girls might affect boys as well, so the best 
alternative is to compare girls living in rural and urban areas. It is assumed that the two groups of 
girls would have followed parallel paths in their schooling without the FPE. This assumption will 
be tested in the robustness checks. 
Thus, the principal idea of the second comparison is to compare girls aged six to 11 with a 
population of girls aged 12 to 14 at two different periods: 1996 and 2001 for the short-term 
evaluation; and 2001 and 2006 for the medium-term evaluation. In the short-term, two treatment 
groups have been retained: the younger cohort of girls born between 1988 and 1990; and the 
middle cohort of girls born between 1985 and 1987. The control group called older cohort A 
consists of girls born between 1982 and 1984. In the medium-term, additional birth cohorts have 
been selected to capture the impact on girls who started primary school with the FPE.  Hence, in 
the medium-term evaluation the younger cohort consists of girls born between 1993 and 1995; 
the middle cohort consists of girls born between 1990 and 1992 and the older cohort A consists 
of girls born between 1987 and 1989. The main advantage of this comparison is that the children 
in the older cohort A could not be the recipients of the program because they were likely to be 
registered in secondary school. Another advantage is that the comparison is made between those 
cohorts in two different periods, which should help eliminate any issues. 
The third comparison takes advantage of the differences in birth cohorts over time. In the short-
term analysis, the periods are 1996 and 2001. In the medium-term analysis, the periods are 2001 
and 2006. 
Table 1: Summary of identification strategies in the medium term (DHS 2001/2006) 
  Treatment  Control  
First difference Areas of residence Girls in rural areas Girls in urban areas 
Second difference Birth cohorts Younger cohort (1993-1995) Older cohort (1987-1989) 
Middle cohort (1990-1992) Older cohort (1987-1989) 
Third difference Periods DHS 2001 DHS 2006 
Source: Author 
Finally, the triple differences evaluation method has been used due to the double comparison 
and to the time periods. The triple differences method can give more robust results than the 
difference-in-differences (DID) method (see Gruber (1994), Ravallion et al. 2005). In fact, the 
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first difference is between rural and urban areas. The second difference is among younger and 
older cohorts. The third difference is in the periods of time (1996 to 2001 and 2001 to 2006).  
One of the strength of these identification strategies is based on the parallel trend assumption of 
the triple difference method. Finally the parallel trend assumption will be verified in the 
robustness checks. More details on the different cohorts are given in the following section.  
 
3.2 Data and descriptive evidence 
The data are taken from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of Benin for the periods 
1996, 2001 and 2006 (“Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Benin”), which were gathered by 
the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE, Benin) in collaboration with 
Macro International Inc. The 1996 DHS was used for the pre-treatment year, because no child 
was a beneficiary of the policy at that time. Thus, a comparison of the 1996 and 2001 results 
could show the effect of the policy within the first year of its implementation. This corresponds to 
the short-term analysis. The 2006 DHS was a post-treatment year, and comparing it with the 2001 
DHS may reveal the medium-term effects.  
It is worth noting that the launch of the second FPE policy was within the data collection period 
of the 2006 DHS. The survey was conducted from August 3 to November 18, 2006, and relates to 
the end of academic year 2005-2006 and the beginning of academic year 2006-2007. The issue is 
that enrollment could have increased as a consequence of the new policy in October 2006. It is 
assumed, however, that the short period between the launch of the second FPE policy and the end 
of data collection would not be sufficient for any effects of the second FPE policy to be observed. 
Indeed, the information could have taken time to reach all regions of the country, so the impact 
might be negligible in a one-month period. The robustness check will control for and discuss the 
possible impact. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
Means of variables Younger cohort  Middle cohort  Older cohort A 
Child’s age 9.284 
(2.670) 
11.971 
(2.610) 
14.976 
(2.640) 
Current enrollment .461 
(.498) 
.501 
(.500) 
.376 
(.484) 
Current enrollment in rural areas .394 
(.488) 
.424 
(.494) 
.306 
(.460) 
Current enrollment in urban areas .616 
(.486) 
.641 
(.479) 
.486 
(.499) 
Current enrollment of girls .372 
(.483) 
.368 
(.482) 
.251 
(.434) 
Current enrollment of girls in rural areas .298 
(.457) 
.282 
(.450) 
.166 
(.372) 
Current enrollment of girls in urban areas .532 
(.499) 
.509 
(.500) 
.372 
(.483) 
Current enrollment of boys .543 
(.498) 
.622 
(.485) 
.499 
(.500) 
    
Mean of dropouts  .067 
(.250) 
.106 
(.308) 
.213 
(.409) 
Mean of dropouts in rural areas  .066 
(.249) 
.100 
(.301) 
.196 
(.398) 
Mean of dropouts in urban areas .068 
(.253) 
.114 
(.317) 
.233 
(.423) 
Mean of dropouts for girls .064 
(.246) 
.122 
(.328) 
.204 
(.403) 
Mean of dropouts for girls in rural areas .065 
(.247) 
.110 
(.313) 
.171 
(.377) 
Mean of dropouts for girls in urban areas .063 
(.243) 
.136 
(.343) 
.237 
(.426) 
Mean of dropouts for boys .069 
(.254) 
.094 
(.291) 
.220 
(.414) 
    
Years of schooling 1.371 
(1.930) 
2.253 
(2.965) 
2.699 
 (3.228) 
Years of schooling in rural areas 1.098 
(1.711) 
1.686 
(2.248) 
1.908  
(2.693) 
Years of schooling in urban areas 2.007 
(2.236) 
3.288 
(3.738) 
3.947  
(3.589) 
Years of schooling of girls 1.068 
(1.744) 
1.754 
(2.480) 
1.903 
(2.967) 
Years of schooling of girls in rural areas .793 
(1.468) 
1.152 
(2.007) 
1.240 
(4.647) 
Years of schooling of girls in urban areas 1.663 
(2.109) 
2.744 
(2.840) 
3.596 
(7.678) 
Years of schooling of boys 1.657 
(2.049) 
2.661 
(2.582) 
3.480 
(3.284) 
Observations  5,511 4,255 3,786 
Standard deviations are in brackets 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996, 2001 
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Furthermore, the dataset for household members has been constrained to the population aged 
six to 22 years old, which is of interest in this paper. In Benin, the primary school age is 
theoretically between six and 11 years old, while the secondary school age is between 12 and 18 
years old. The sample has been extended to 22 years of age to include older cohorts of children. 
Information on each individual in the sample has been completed with data on the head of 
household by merging the household member datasets with a dataset of heads of households.  
Table 2 displays the mean and standard deviations of the different birth cohorts. The outcome 
variables retained are: current enrollment, dropout probability, and years of schooling completed. 
The table shows that current enrollment is higher for the younger birth cohorts compared to the 
older birth cohorts. Approximately 46.1% of children between six and eight years old are 
enrolled in school as opposed to 37.6% of children between 12 and 14 years old. The trends of 
enrollment in rural and urban areas are quite similar in every cohort. Yet, current enrollment is 
more noteworthy in urban than in rural areas. In fact, 61.6% of the children in the younger 
cohorts are enrolled in urban areas compared to 39.4% of children in the same cohort in rural 
areas. Moreover, current enrollment figures are also higher for boys compared to girls. On 
average, 54.1% of boys are enrolled in contrast to 37.2% of girls. 
The statistical mean of dropout increases with the child’s age. On average, 6% of children in the 
younger cohorts left school compared to 21% in the older cohorts. However, there is not much 
difference in the statistical mean of dropout in terms of gender and area of residence. 
Table 2 indicates that children in the older cohort (aged 12 and 14) have completed 2.69 years 
of schooling on average, with a standard deviation of 3.22 years. It is important to note that 
around 40% of individuals in the sample have completed zero years of schooling, which might 
explain the very low statistics of years of schooling. The table also reveals some dissimilarity in 
years of schooling, according to gender and area of residence. Children in urban areas complete 
more years of schooling on average than children in rural areas. Children in the middle cohort 
living in rural areas have 1.68 years of schooling with a standard deviation of 2.24 years, while 
children in urban areas have an average of 3.28 years of schooling with a standard deviation of 
3.73. Additionally, boys complete around one more year of schooling than girls.  
In the main, the trend in current enrollment, school dropouts and years of schooling are roughly 
similar in urban and rural areas. It suggests that the assumption of parallel trends in schooling 
might be verified.  
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3.3  Estimation procedure 
Following identification of the groups, estimation of the different effects is straightforward. The 
objective of the paper is to assess the impacts of the FPE policy on schooling: the outcome 
variables are the probability of current enrollment, of dropping out and years of schooling 
completed. As a reminder, girls living in rural areas are the treatment group and girls living in 
urban areas are the control group.  
Nevertheless, it is important to analyze the effects of the policy on the schooling of boys. 
Indeed, households have limited resources, and a reduction in the marginal costs for a child could 
result in choosing education for that child to the detriment of the other children. In this particular 
case, the program may disadvantage boys. Given the plausible impact on boys, the estimates are 
run separately for boys and girls. The triple difference equation is: 
Y =  α! + α!X + α!year + α!cohort + α!cohort ∗ year + α!rural + α!rural ∗ year + α!cohort ∗ rural +α!cohort ∗ rural ∗ year + µ   (Equation 1) 
where Y is the schooling outcome; X a set of demographic variables for the child and the 
household; cohort equals 1 if the child is in the treatment cohort (e.g. younger or middle cohort) 
and 0 otherwise; year is a dummy variable for the post-treatment year (2001 or 2006) which 
represents the trend in the outcome; rural is a dummy variable that has value 1 if the child lives 
in a rural area and 0 otherwise; α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6, α7 and α8 are coefficients while µ is the 
error term. α8 is the parameter of interest, which gives the impact of the FPE policy on schooling. 
The explanatory variables are: the head of household’s age, gender and level of education, the 
number of children under five years old; the household's level of wealth; the child’s age and 
regions are dummy variables. Chernichovsky (1985) showed that the presence of younger 
siblings could be a barrier to girls’ education due to the need for childcare. Also, number of 
siblings in the household could reveal potential competition in terms of resources devoted to 
education (Glick and Sahn, 2001; Tansel 1997; Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998; Bommier and 
Lambert, 2000). In this paper we used the household level of wealth to capture the influence of 
the household wealth. The DHS databases contain a standardized wealth index, which is 
computed based on the belongings of the households (see Filmer and Pritchett, 1998). This study 
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uses the quintile of wealth to observe the heterogeneity of the impact of the FPE of 2001 
according to the household’s wealth.  
In an extension of Equation 1, an additional variable of distance to school has been included. 
The parents’ decision to provide education for their child could also depend on indirect 
educational costs. These include, for example, distance to school, uniform fees, and parent-
teacher association fees. School fees might have decreased, but the remaining costs may still be a 
burden for parents. This could explain why, even with the elimination of direct costs, some 
children are still not enrolled in primary school. Other costs, such as distance to school, may have 
more of an impact on enrollment and years of schooling than the direct costs. Moreover, the 
distance to school is a proxy for educational costs and is commonly used in economics (Birdsal 
and Orivel, 1996; Lavy, 1996; Tansel, 1997). The distance to school represents the potential 
transportation costs that parents have to pay for their children to attend school regularly. Previous 
studies have found that the decision of parents to send their children to primary school also 
depends on the distance to secondary school. Tansel (1997) found that the distance to secondary 
school influences the schooling of children in primary school. Parents could be more reticent to 
send their children to primary school if there is no secondary school in their area of residence, for 
the child to further its education. The enrollment in primary school might be delayed or canceled 
in such a case. Both distances to primary school and to secondary school are introduced in the 
equations as indicators of indirect schooling costs. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of the distance (kilometers) to primary and secondary schools   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
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The DHS databases contain details of distance (in kilometers) in the DHS of 1996 and 2001 
only, so distance to school can only be included in the short-term analysis. Figure 3 displays the 
distance to primary and secondary school as taken from the 1996 and 2001 DHS.  
Figure 3 indicates that some individuals in the sample live up to 30 kilometers from the closest 
primary school and others live up to 100 kilometers from the closest secondary school. Despite 
the fact that such cases are rare, it shows that distance to school could influence decisions about 
schooling.  	
The chart on the left indicates that about 80% of children in the sample are less than one 
kilometer away from a primary school, and suggests that the distance to primary school does not 
vary much. However, the model includes the distance to primary school for theoretical reasons.  
In contrast, there is noticeable variability in the distance to the closest secondary school (figure 
on the right). Thus, it is possible to introduce distance to school in the analysis with the following 
equations: 
 Y =  α! + α!X + α!year + α!cohort + α!cohort ∗ year + α!rural + α!rural ∗ year + α!cohort ∗ rural +α!cohort ∗ rural ∗ year + α!distance_zero + α!"distance_zero ∗ year + v   (Equation 2) 
 Y =  α! + α!X + α!year + α!cohort + α!cohort ∗ year + α!rural + α!rural ∗ year + α!cohort ∗ rural +α!cohort ∗ rural ∗ year + α!distance_zero + α!"distance_zero ∗ year + α!distance_1to5km +α!"distance_1to5km ∗ year + v   (Equation 3) 
 
Equation 2 includes only the distance to the closest primary school and Equation 3 includes the 
distance to the closest secondary school. Hence, distance_zero is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the child lives less than one kilometer from the closest primary school or secondary school and 
0 otherwise; distance_1to5km equals 1 if the child lives between one and five kilometers from the 
closest secondary school. Estimates were made using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
The results of the evaluation are presented in Section 4. 
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4. Impact of the Free Primary Education policy of 2001 
This section presents the results of the probabilities of current enrollment, of dropping out of 
school, and years of schooling completed in the short- and medium-term. The variables current 
enrollment and years of schooling are directly available from the database, but there is no direct 
information on dropouts in the 1996 DHS. For this year, the variable dropouts7 was obtained 
from a question on whether or not the child is still enrolled. All estimates in the short-term have 
been performed with a pooled sample of the 1996 and 2001 DHS while the estimates in the 
medium-term have been performed with a pooled sample of the 2001 and 2006 DHS. 
 
4.1 Impacts of the FPE policy of 2001 on current enrollment 
4.1.1 Short-term impacts on current enrollment 
Overall the estimates reveal that the likelihood of enrollment has significantly increased for 
girls in rural areas only. 
Table 2 presents the impact of the FPE policy on current enrollment of girls and of boys. The 
estimates were performed using Equation 1. Columns 1 and 3 present the basic regressions 
without other explanatory variables. Columns 2 and 4 present the regressions with the additional 
independent variables and are the full models. The results of both models are roughly similar, 
apart from some significant parameters.  
In the first and second columns of Table 3, there are two equations for girls of the younger 
cohorts of birth (aged 6 to 8) and two equations for the middle cohorts of birth (aged 9 to 11). 
The control group for all four equations is girls living in urban areas and in the older cohort A 
(aged 12 to 14). In the third and fourth columns the same equations have been used for boys. 
There are also two equations for boys in the younger cohorts and two equations for the middle 
cohorts of birth. Columns 2 and 4 suggest that children in the younger cohort are more likely to 
be enrolled than children of the older cohort A.  
 
 
																																								 																				
7	The DHS 1996 does not contain information on whether a child has dropped out per se. As a result, it has been 
assumed that a child who is enrolled in year t-1 and not enrolled in year t has abandoned school. Thus, the answer 
“no” to the question “Is the household member still enrolled?” has been recorded as “yes” for dropout. 	
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Table 3: Impacts of the FPE policy on current enrollment in the short-term (full DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations for the regressions on the younger cohort 4,515 4,509 4,723 4,715 
R-squared for the regressions on younger cohort 0.088 0.179 0.095 0.221 
Observations for the regressions on the middle cohort 3,874 3,869 4,101 4,094 
R-squared for the regressions on middle cohort 0.073 0.171 0.068 0.205 
     
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 6 to 8 in 1996 or 11 to 
13 in 2001 
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001 
    
     
2001 dummy -0.0955** 1.051*** -0.178*** 1.320*** 
 (0.0378) (0.281) (0.0440) (0.268) 
Younger cohort 0.0785*** 0.304*** -0.0882** 0.363*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0702) (0.0358) (0.0689) 
Younger cohort* 2001 dummy 0.168*** -0.346*** 0.358*** -0.279*** 
 (0.0489) (0.107) (0.0470) (0.101) 
Dummy for rural areas -0.222*** -0.0551* -0.215*** -0.0473 
 (0.0359) (0.0311) (0.0493) (0.0394) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2001 dummy 0.0210 -0.0152 0.0384 -0.0142 
 (0.0482) (0.0438) (0.0637) (0.0549) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.0553 -0.0725** -0.0608 -0.0916** 
 (0.0377) (0.0368) (0.0459) (0.0421) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0963 0.110* 0.0978 0.0855 
 (0.0599) (0.0578) (0.0622) (0.0577) 
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001     
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
2001 dummy -0.0955** 0.174 -0.178*** 0.222 
 (0.0378) (0.302) (0.0440) (0.323) 
Middle cohort -0.222*** -0.0599* 0.120*** 0.0835** 
 (0.0359) (0.0305) (0.0314) (0.0421) 
Middle cohort* 2001 dummy 0.0210 -0.0257 0.0891** 0.0368 
 (0.0482) (0.0441) (0.0637) (0.0553) 
Dummy for rural areas 0.119*** 0.0340 -0.215*** -0.0486 
 (0.0390) (0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0395) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2001 dummy 0.0414 -0.0317 0.0384 0.00138 
 (0.0553) (0.0716) (0.0637) (0.0553) 
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.0365 -0.0428 -0.0751* -0.0623* 
 (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0396) (0.0352) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0443 0.0511 0.0964 0.0634 
 (0.0660) (0.0629) (0.0592) (0.0560) 
     
Other covariates No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted (robust) for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on 1996 and 2001 DHS  
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Table 4: Impacts of the FPE on current enrollment with the distance to school in the short-term 
(full DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001     
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.0495 -0.0426 -0.0622* -0.0505 
 (0.0434) (0.0431) (0.0353) (0.0353) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0550 0.0473 0.0636 0.0556 
 (0.0630) (0.0627) (0.0562) (0.0553) 
Distance to the closest primary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer 0.175***  0.299***  
 (0.0403)  (0.0745)  
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy -0.153**  -0.102  
 (0.0665)  (0.0855)  
Distance to the closest secondary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer  0.154***  0.162*** 
  (0.0456)  (0.0381) 
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy  -0.0469  -0.0655 
  (0.0573)  (0.0574) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers  0.0823*  0.0981** 
  (0.0461)  (0.0420) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers* 2001 dummy  -0.00971  -0.0376 
  (0.0556)  (0.0570) 
     
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.833*** 0.829*** 0.682*** 0.854*** 
 (0.157) (0.163) (0.168) (0.164) 
Observations  3,869 3,869 4,094 4,094 
R-squared 0.177 0.178 0.216 0.213 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted (robust) for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. The 
dummies for the year 2001, the younger cohort, rural areas and their interactions are also included. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
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In contrast, children in rural areas are less likely to be enrolled than children in urban areas. 
Column 2 indicates that girls in rural areas and in the younger cohorts have an 11% greater 
chance of being enrolled in 2001. It means that the FPE policy has significantly increased the 
probability of enrollment of girls in rural areas. However, there is no significant impact on the 
middle cohorts. Column 4 shows no significant impact of the FPE policy on the current 
enrollment of boys. 
In Table 4, distance to school has been introduced into the models. The estimates in Table 4 
were performed using Equations 2 and 3. The impact of the FPE policy on current enrollment 
does not change with the introduction of distance to school. In fact, the effect of the FPE policy 
on current enrollment is still not significant for girls and boys in rural areas and in the middle 
cohort of births.  This effect is similar for all equations. Hence, the impact of the FPE policy on 
current enrollment does not change much after accounting for the distance to school.  
 
In addition, the likelihood of being enrolled decreases with distance to school. In the first and 
second columns of Table 4, the dummy for distance to primary school was included in the 
regression. The results are only for children in the middle cohorts of birth. These columns show a 
significant effect of the distance to school on enrollment. Indeed, the likelihood of being enrolled 
increased by 17.5% for girls in rural areas compared to girls in urban areas if the closest primary 
school is less than one kilometer away from the household. This parameter is higher for boys. In 
columns 2 and 4 dummy variables for the distance to secondary school have been introduced in 
the regressions. The likelihood of being enrolled increased by 15.4% if a girl lives less than one 
kilometer from the closest secondary school, and 8.23% if a girl lives between one and five 
kilometers from the closest secondary school. Thus, a girl has a greater chance of being enrolled 
if she lives closer to the school. Moreover, the effects of distance to school are alike for the 
younger cohorts, but the parameters are lower. This might be explained by the fact that children 
aged six to eight are more likely to be accompanied to school by their parents or an adult 
household member. These results are similar to previous studies (Birdsall and Orivel, 1996; 
Tansel 1997) in other sub-Saharan countries. 
In terms of heterogeneity of the impact, Table 5 reveals that the effect of the FPE policy on 
current enrollment of girls in rural areas increased with the level of wealth. Equation 1 with 
additional variables was used to estimate the results in Table 5. In 2001, the probability of being 
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enrolled has not significantly improved for girls in the lowest quintile of wealth, but had 
increased by 38.0% for the girls in the fourth quintile of wealth. Despite the abolition of fees, it 
appears that the wealthy households have gained more from the policy than poor households. 
This result is in agreement with Lincove (2009). The author found that that Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) in Nigeria was unevenly targeted and resulted in persistent wealth differences. 
In contrast, Lincove (2012) found a low gap in wealth in Uganda.  
In summary, the FPE policy has significantly increased the probability of enrollment of girls 
in rural areas and in the younger cohorts in the short-term. Nevertheless, poorer households have 
benefited less from the program that wealthy ones. 
 
Table 5: Heterogeneity of impacts of the FPE policy on current enrollment of girls in the short-
term (DHS 1996/2001) 
 Girls 
Variables OLS 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment  
Treatment sample: girls aged 6 to 8 in 1996 or 11 to 13 in 2001 
Control: girls aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 2001 
 
  
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Lowest quintile of wealth -0.124 
 (0.0867) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Lowest quintile of wealth*2001 dummy 0.137 
 (0.115) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Second quintile of wealth -0.225** 
 (0.0887) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Second quintile of wealth*2001 dummy 0.325*** 
 (0.118) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Middle quintile of wealth -0.281*** 
 (0.0857) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Middle quintile of wealth*2001 dummy 0.345*** 
 (0.114) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Fourth quintile of wealth -0.180** 
 (0.0833) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Fourth quintile of wealth*2001 dummy 0.380*** 
 (0.116) 
  
Other covariates Yes 
Constant 0.142 
 (0.161) 
Observations  4,509 
R-squared 0.186 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted (robust) for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. The 
dummies for the year 2001, the younger cohort, rural areas and their interactions are also included. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
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4.1.2 Medium-term impact on current enrollment 
In general, Table 6 shows a significant positive impact of the FPE policy on current 
enrollment in the medium-term.  
Tables 3 and 6 have the same structure. In fact, the results in Table 6 were obtained after 
estimation using Equation 1 but with a pooled sample of DHS 2001 and 2006. The first two 
columns present the basic regressions (without additional variables), while columns 3 and 4 
present the full regressions (with other independent variables). According to column 2 in Table 6, 
the probability of girls' enrollment in rural areas and in the younger cohorts of birth (aged 6 to 8) 
increased by 13.4% in 2006.  
The impact is not significant for girls in rural areas and in the middle cohorts. This means that 
the enrollment of girls aged (9 to 11) has not significantly increased.  
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Table 6: Impact of the FPE on current enrollment in the medium-term (full DHS 2001/2006) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations for the regressions on the younger cohort 8,208 8,200 8,912 8,902 
R-squared for the regressions on younger cohort 0.084 0.186 0.069 0.146 
Observations for the regressions on the middle cohort 6,880 6,873 7,989 7,982 
R-squared for the regressions on middle cohort 0.064 0.177 0.034 0.165 
     
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 6 to 8 in 2001 or 11 to 
13 in 2006 
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 2001 or 17 to 19 in 
2006 
    
     
2006 dummy -0.0972*** 1.570*** -0.116*** -0.120** 
 (0.0326) (0.216) (0.0312) (0.0611) 
Younger cohort 0.0158 0.422*** -0.120*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0731) (0.0294) (0.0294) 
Younger cohort* 2006 dummy 0.234*** -0.452*** 0.289*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0888) (0.0361) (0.0356) 
Dummy for rural areas -0.156*** -0.0201 -0.163*** -0.0925*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0357) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2006 dummy -0.0332 -0.0524 0.0215 0.0202 
 (0.0451) (0.0432) (0.0472) (0.0438) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.0421 -0.0760* -0.0613 -0.0565 
 (0.0466) (0.0441) (0.0384) (0.0383) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2006 dummy 0.133** 0.134*** 0.0924* 0.0771 
 (0.0527) (0.0502) (0.0483) (0.0474) 
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 2001 or 14 
to 16 in 2006     
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 2001 or 17 to 19 in 
2006	     
2006 dummy -0.0972*** 0.366 -0.116*** 0.406** 
 (0.0326) (0.238) (0.0312) (0.206) 
Middle cohort 0.122*** 0.0745 0.0770*** 0.0691* 
 (0.0321) (0.0485) (0.0220) (0.0378) 
Middle cohort* 2006 dummy 0.0803** -0.0281 0.0223 -0.0632 
 (0.0372) (0.0570) -0.163*** -0.0821** 
Dummy for rural areas -0.156*** -0.0475 (0.0384) (0.0339) 
 (0.0387) (0.0387) 0.0215 0.0303 
Dummy for rural areas * 2006 dummy -0.0332 -0.0185 (0.0472) (0.0422) 
 (0.0452) (0.0431) (0.0637) (0.0553) 
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.00132 -0.00439 -0.000785 0.0116 
 (0.0416) (0.0401) (0.0317) (0.0306) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2006 dummy 0.0120 0.00220 0.0309 0.0121 
 (0.0495) (0.0475) (0.0421) (0.0398) 
Other covariates No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the household head’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2001 and 2006 
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of impacts of the FPE policy on current enrollment of girls in the 
medium-term (DHS 2001/2006) 
 Girls 
 (1) 
Variables OLS 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment  
Treatment sample girls aged 6 to 8 in 2001 or 11 to 13 in 2006 
Control: girls aged 12 to 14 in 2001 or 17 to 19 in 2006 
 
  
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Lowest quintile of wealth -0.198** 
 (0.0837) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Lowest quintile of wealth*2006 dummy 0.110 
 (0.0945) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Second quintile of wealth -0.164* 
 (0.0868) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Second quintile of wealth*2006 dummy 0.119 
 (0.0991) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Middle quintile of wealth -0.193** 
 (0.0822) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Middle quintile of wealth*2006 dummy 0.145 
 (0.0892) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Fourth quintile of wealth -0.136* 
 (0.0828) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*Dummy for Fourth quintile of wealth*2006 dummy 0.108 
 (0.0923) 
  
Other covariates Yes 
Constant -0.285* 
 (0.154) 
Observations  8,200 
R-squared 0.187 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted (robust) for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. The 
dummies for the year 2001, the younger cohort, rural areas and their interactions are also included. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2001 and 2006 
 
The girls in the middle cohorts had already started primary school before the launch of the 
policy. It implies that they have not really benefited from the program. There is also no 
significant effect on the current enrollment of boys in rural areas. It also appears that the effect of 
wealth reduced in 2006. Actually, there is no significant increase in enrollment of girls in any 
quintile of wealth in comparison to the fifth quintile of wealth, which suggests that there is no 
significant difference in enrollment with regard to the quintiles of wealth in 2006. Overall, in the 
medium-term, the FPE policy significantly increased the probability of enrollment of girls in 
rural areas regardless of the households’ level of wealth.  
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4.2 Impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on dropout probability 
4.2.1 Short-term impact of the FPE policy on dropout probability 
Table 8 displays the impact of the FPE policy on dropout probability. The estimates were 
performed using Equation 1. Generally, the probability of dropping out has not significantly 
changed in the short-term for girls in rural areas who are in the treatment group. Surprisingly, the 
probability of dropping out increased for boys in rural areas. 
In column 2 of table 8, the parameter for girls in rural areas is not statistically significant for the 
younger or middle cohorts of birth. Column 4 of table 8 suggests that the dropout probability has 
significantly increased by 10.5% for boys in rural areas and in the younger cohorts of birth. There 
is however no significant effect on boys in the middle cohorts of birth. The impact on boys could 
be explained by the constraint of household wealth. In fact, households decide to enroll or 
withdraw a child based on different factors, including wealth. If school fees are removed for girls, 
it is plausible that parents prefer to send girls to school instead of boys. Another explanation 
might be, that primary schools prioritized the enrollment of girls over boys. Indeed, the 
government provided funds to support primary schools according to the number of girls enrolled, 
which was meant to encourage girls’ enrollment. This effect could be a drawback of the program. 
In Table 9, distance to school has been included in the regressions. The results of Table 9 have 
been obtained using Equations 2 and 3. The impact of the FPE policy on dropout probability did 
not change after introduction of the distance to school, and its impact on the probability of girls 
dropping out is still not statistically significant. Moreover, the increase in the probability of boys 
in rural areas in the younger cohort who drop out went from 10.5% in the basic model to 10.7% 
in the models including distance to primary schools. In addition, the probability of dropping out 
significantly increased with distance to school. The probability of dropping out of school 
decreased by 30.9% for the girls in rural areas in the middle cohort who live less than one 
kilometer away from the closest primary school, according to Column 1 of table 9.  
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Table 8: Impact of the FPE policy on dropout probability in the short-term (full DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations for the regressions on the younger cohort 2,830 2,824 3,501 3,493 
R-squared for the regressions on younger cohort 0.053 0.087 0.065 0.085 
Observations for the regressions on the middle cohort 2,492 2,487 3,256 3,249 
R-squared for the regressions on middle cohort 0.024 0.078 0.054 0.084 
     
Dependent variable: Dropout     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 6 to 8 in 1996 or 11 to 
13 in 2001 
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001 
    
     
2001 dummy 0.0537 -0.280 0.186*** -0.254 
 (0.0368) (0.265) (0.0318) (0.265) 
Younger cohort -0.167*** -0.136 -0.0538** 0.0117 
 (0.0308) (0.0926) (0.0242) (0.0613) 
Younger cohort* 2001 dummy -0.0145 0.0724 -0.191*** -0.0894 
 (0.0388) (0.111) (0.0349) (0.0878) 
Dummy for rural areas 0.0224 -0.0140 0.0439 0.0295 
 (0.0458) (0.0441) (0.0290) (0.0304) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2001 dummy -0.129** -0.0462 -0.104** -0.0864* 
 (0.0548) (0.0529) (0.0442) (0.0467) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas 0.0302 0.0341 -0.0506 -0.0544 
 (0.0531) (0.0526) (0.0343) (0.0346) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0568 0.0465 0.105** 0.105** 
 (0.0608) (0.0602) (0.0477) (0.0483) 
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001     
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
2001 dummy 0.0537 -0.241 0.186*** -0.214 
 (0.0368) (0.302) (0.0318) (0.268) 
Middle cohort -0.128*** -0.0463 -0.0892*** -0.0328 
 (0.0334) (0.0591) (0.0235) (0.0359) 
Middle cohort* 2001 dummy 0.0431 0.0733 -0.0795** -0.0290 
 (0.0482) (0.0441) (0.0365) (0.0570) 
Dummy for rural areas 0.0224 -0.0110 0.0439 0.0187 
 (0.0458) (0.0451) (0.0290) (0.0310) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2001 dummy -0.129** -0.0302 -0.104** -0.0697 
 (0.0548) (0.0530) (0.0442) (0.0465) 
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.00697 0.00215 -0.0183 -0.0170 
 (0.0517) (0.0501) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0607 0.0493 0.0493 0.0523 
 (0.0634) (0.0619) (0.0488) (0.0491) 
     
Other covariates No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted (robust) for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
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Table 9: Impact of the FPE policy on dropout probability considering distance to school in the 
short-term (full DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Dropout     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001 
    
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.00697 0.00215 -0.0183 -0.0170 
 (0.0517) (0.0501) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.0607 0.0493 0.0493 0.0523 
 (0.0634) (0.0619) (0.0488) (0.0491) 
     
Distance to the closest primary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer -0.309***  -0.0536  
 (0.0494)  (0.109)  
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy 0.368***  0.0906  
 (0.0601)  (0.116)  
     
Distance to the closest secondary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer  -0.0996**  -0.0721*** 
  (0.0398)  (0.0218) 
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy  0.112**  0.114*** 
  (0.0479)  (0.0380) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers  -0.0641  -0.0549** 
  (0.0447)  (0.0242) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers* 2001 dummy  0.0725  0.0596 
  (0.0504)  (0.0364) 
     
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.147 -0.0843 -0.0415 -0.0497 
 (0.222) (0.236) (0.168) (0.137) 
Observations  2,487 2,487 3,249 3,249 
R-squared 0.081 0.080 0.085 0.088 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. The 
dummies for the year 2001, the younger cohort, rural areas and their interactions are also included. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
 
With regards to Column 2 of table 9, the probability of dropping out of school decreased by 
9.96% for girls who live less than one kilometer from the closest secondary school. The effect of 
distance to school on boys is less important than for girls. The probability of dropping out for 
boys who live less than one kilometer from the closest primary school decreased by 7.21%, 
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according to Column 4 of table 9. For reasons of presentation, the table does not contain the 
equations for the younger cohorts. 
In terms of heterogeneity in wealth, there is no significant difference in the probability of 
dropping out according to the household’s level of wealth. This means that households in rural 
areas withdrew boys from primary school independent of wealth level. Thus, the increase in boys 
dropping out affected all wealth levels. Finally, the FPE policy had no significant impact on the 
probability of girls dropping out in rural areas. Yet, there has been a significant decrease in the 
probability of boys dropping out in the same areas.  
 
4.2.2 Medium-term impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on dropout probability 
The results of the medium-term impact of the FPE policy on dropouts are not presented. 
However, the probability of dropping out is not statistically significant in 2006 for girls in rural 
areas. There is also no significant impact of the FPE policy on the probability of boys dropping 
out in the medium-term.    
In conclusion, the FPE policy has no significant impact on the probability of dropping out of 
school for girls in rural areas. Nevertheless, after the program was implemented, the probability 
of boys dropping out significantly increased in the short-term. However, the effect was no longer 
significant in the medium-term. 
 
4.3 Impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on years of schooling completed  
In the database used for the estimates, more than 40% of individuals between six and 22 years 
old have zero years of schooling. It is worth noting that people who have zero years of schooling 
have either never started primary school or have not been able to complete the first grade of 
primary school. The results in section 4.1 already considered the enrollment of children who 
started primary school under the program, which is not the focus of this section. The goal of this 
evaluation of years of schooling is to observe the impact of the FPE policy on children that have 
already started school. In other words, do children enrolled during the program stay in school 
longer? Therefore, the sample has been restricted to individuals with at least one year of 
education. Hence, the variable years of schooling completed starts with the first grade of primary 
school.  
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4.3.1 Short-term impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on years of schooling 
The FPE policy has no significant impact on years of schooling in the short-term. This result is 
expected because the evaluation in the short-term falls within the first year of the program. The 
period is thus too short to expect significant results for years of schooling completed.  
Nevertheless, Table 9 reveals significant effects of distance to school on years of schooling. The 
results in Table 9 were obtained using Equations 2 and 3. Column 2 shows that for girls in rural 
areas and in the middle cohort, the probability of completing one year of schooling increases by 
58.9% if the secondary school is less than one kilometer from the household. The probability is 
about 30.1% if the closest secondary school is between one and five kilometers from the 
household. Hence, the likelihood to complete a grade decreases with increases in distance to 
school. The effect of distance to school is also more noticeable for girls than for boys. These 
results are in agreement with the literature.  
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Table 10: Impact of the FPE policy on years of schooling completed including distance to school 
in the short-term (full DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Years of schooling completed     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001 
    
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
Middle cohort*Dummy for rural areas 0.333* 0.375** 0.271* 0.314** 
 (0.192) (0.189) (0.141) (0.144) 
Middle cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy 0.338 0.311 -0.320 -0.351 
 (0.394) (0.391) (0.306) (0.306) 
     
Distance to the closest primary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer -0.121  0.332  
 (0.159)  (0.343)  
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy -0.0915  0.687  
 (0.608)  (0.455)  
     
Distance to the closest secondary school     
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer  0.589***  0.384*** 
  (0.167)  (0.134) 
Dummy for less than 1 kilometer* 2001 dummy  -0.179  -0.0150 
  (0.324)  (0.255) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers  0.301*  0.215* 
  (0.161)  (0.128) 
Dummy for 1 to 5 kilometers* 2001 dummy  0.243  0.151 
  (0.310)  (0.248) 
     
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.416 -1.997** -1.394** -1.280* 
 (0.871) (0.892) (0.696) (0.662) 
Observations  1,585 1,585 2,774 2,774 
R-squared 0.435 0.440 0.502 0.502 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. The 
dummies for the year 2001, the younger cohort, rural areas and their interactions are also included. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
 
4.3.2 Medium-term impact on years of schooling 
In the medium-term, the FPE policy had also no statistically significant impact on the years 
completed for girls in rural areas. The results suggest that girls who have completed at least one 
year of schooling before the program was implemented do not stay longer in school. There are 
two possible explanations. First, it is possible that the evaluation period is not long enough. The 
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effects might appear in the long run. Second, it could be a shortcoming of the program. Indeed, 
the FPE policy has just been an elimination of school fees, which are only a part of the cost of 
education. It is plausible that children who are already enrolled encounter difficulties with other 
costs and not just with the direct costs of education. That might explain why there is no effect 
with the FPE policy, but distance to school is significant.  
In conclusion, the FPE policy has significantly increased the probability of current enrollment 
of girls in rural areas, but has no impact on the probability of dropping out and years of 
schooling.  In the short-term, the probability of boys dropping out has increased, but the effect 
disappears in the medium-term. Distance to school, as a proxy for other educational costs 
(opportunity costs), had a significant negative effect on schooling. These results suggest that 
there are other plausible costs than direct school costs that may impinge on girls' schooling.  The 
following section presents the robustness checks. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Placebo experiment 1: Impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on the older cohorts of birth  
The 2000 Banque Mondiale report on Benin's educational system reveals that children usually 
complete primary school by 14 years of age. This could be a threat to the identification strategies, 
because the older cohort A, which is the control group, includes children between 12 and 14 
years old. It is thus necessary to run an additional control experiment comparing the older cohort 
A to other older cohorts of births. The comparison is between the older cohort A (aged 12 to 14) 
and the older cohort B (aged 15 to 17). Hence, the children born between 1979 and 1981 are 
included in the older cohort B in the short-term evaluation, while the children born between 1984 
and 1986 are included in the older cohort B in the medium-term evaluation. The goal of this 
robustness check is to demonstrate that the older cohort A did not benefit from the FPE. 
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Table 11: Impact of the FPE policy on current enrollment of older children in the short-term (full 
DHS 1996/2001) 
  Girls  Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 
to 19 in 2001 
Control: individuals aged 15 to 17 in 1996 or 20 to 22 in 
2001 
    
     
2001 dummy -0.179*** -0.586** -0.171*** -0.220 
 (0.0389) (0.288) (0.0488) (0.362) 
Older cohort A 0.0881** -0.00341 0.144*** 0.0511 
 (0.0379) (0.0560) (0.0437) (0.0511) 
Older cohort A * 2001 dummy 0.0833* 0.119* -0.00727 -0.00363 
 (0.0475) (0.0666) (0.0537) (0.0705) 
Dummy for rural areas -0.201*** -0.0622 -0.231*** -0.0476 
 (0.0411) (0.0413) (0.0471) (0.0422) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2001 dummy 0.0785* 0.0447 0.0200 -0.00137 
 (0.0471) (0.0464) (0.0602) (0.0553) 
Older cohort A *Dummy for rural areas -0.0210 -0.0150 0.0160 -0.00746 
 (0.0457) (0.0424) (0.0523) (0.0449) 
Older cohort A * Dummy for rural areas*2001 dummy -0.0576 -0.0686 0.0184 0.0148 
 (0.0569) (0.0537) (0.0682) (0.0620) 
     
     
Other covariates No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.330*** 0.930*** 0.554*** 1.157*** 
 (0.0323) (0.219) (0.0382) (0.214) 
Observations  3,464 3,459 3,435 3,428 
R-squared  0.093 0.181 0.084 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
 
Table 11 displays the results of the estimates on current enrollment, according to the placebo 
experiment. The equations in Table 11 have been estimated using Equation 1. Overall, there is no 
significant change in the current enrollment of girls of the older cohort A in rural areas in 2001. 
The results are similar for the probability of dropping out and years of schooling. There is also no 
significant impact in the medium-term. These results imply that the older cohort A has not gained 
from the FPE policy, meaning that the impacts observed in the main evaluation are genuinely due 
to the program. 
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5.2 Placebo experiment 2: Impact of the FPE policy of 2001 on children living in urban areas 
The identification strategies had three sources of variations: cohorts of birth, area of residence 
and time. The previous section 5.1 already controlled for the robustness of the control group used 
in combination with birth cohorts. It is thus necessary to control the robustness of the second 
variation with area of residence. It is important to check that no child living in an urban area has 
benefited from the FPE policy. For this control experiment, the difference-in-differences (DID) 
method has been used in the following equation.  
𝑌 =  α! + α!X + α!year + α!cohort + α!cohort ∗ year + w   (Equation 4) 
The difference between Equation 4 and Equation 1 is that the sample has been limited to children 
living in urban areas only. The explanatory variables and results are the same. The estimates were 
also performed separately for girls and boys. The estimates in Table 12 have been obtained with 
Equation 4. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 12 correspond to the equations for the younger cohorts of 
birth, while columns 2 and 4 represent the equations for the middle cohorts. Table 12 indicates 
there was no significant change in the complete OLS estimates of the current enrollment for 
children in urban areas in 2001. For instance, in the columns 1 and 3 of table 12, there is 
significant impact on children in urban areas. However, these equations correspond to basic 
equation without additional covariates. In the full sample, in columns 2 and 4, there is no 
significant impact of the FPE of 2001 on children in urban areas. There is also no significant 
change in the probability of dropping out and years of schooling. The results are the same in the 
medium-term. In other words, children in urban areas have not benefited from the FPE. It 
confirms that the impacts observed with children in rural areas are associated with the program 
and not with another policy. 
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Table 12: Impacts of the FPE policy on current enrollment of children in urban areas in the short-
term (DHS 1996/2001 of children living in urban areas) 
 Girls living in urban areas Boys living in urban areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 6 to 8 in 1996 or 11 to 
13 in 2001 
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001 
    
     
2001 dummy -0.0955** 0.278 -0.178*** 0.683* 
 (0.0378) (0.467) (0.0441) (0.402) 
Younger cohort 0.0785** 0.106 -0.0882** 0.259** 
 (0.0303) (0.128) (0.0359) (0.108) 
Younger cohort* 2001 dummy 0.168*** -0.108 0.358*** -0.189 
 (0.0490) (0.178) (0.0471) (0.158) 
     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 1996 or 14 
to 16 in 2001     
Control: individuals aged 12 to 14 in 1996 or 17 to 19 in 
2001	     
2001 dummy -0.0955** 0.278 -0.178*** 0.683* 
 (0.0378) (0.467) (0.0441) (0.402) 
Middle cohort 0.119*** 0.0629 0.120*** 0.0429 
 (0.0390) (0.0671) (0.0314) (0.0531) 
Middle cohort* 2001 dummy 0.0414 0.0174 0.0891** 0.0555 
 (0.0553) (0.0973) (0.0438) (0.0907) 
     
Other covariates No Yes No Yes 
Observations for the regressions on the younger cohort 1,603 1,600 1,509 1,508 
R-squared for the regressions on younger cohort 0.033 0.152 0.044 0.154 
     
Observations for the regressions on the middle cohort 1,521 1,516 1,428 1,427 
R-squared for the regressions on middle cohort 0.025 0.147 0.055 0.189 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables 
on the head of household’s age, gender and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under 
five years old, districts’ dummies and dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 1996 and 2001 
 
5.3 Migration effect 
Despite the improvement in girls' enrollment, another weakness in the evaluation could be the 
effect of migration. In fact, the launch of the FPE policy may provide an incentive for parents to 
move to rural areas to enroll their children in school. However, waves of migration in Benin are 
generally from rural to urban areas and urban areas are substantially more developed than the 
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rural areas (INSAE, 2002). People are typically looking for job opportunities and better living 
standards, and as a result, migration from urban to rural areas is uncommon.   
Nevertheless, migration could be problematic for this strategy because the initial treatment group 
could vary simply due to migration, and may suggest a misleading effect of the policy. Therefore, 
the variable moved has been created. The DHS databases contain a variable on the number of 
years the household has lived in the current place of residence. This variable comes from the 
dataset containing mothers, which has been re-coded here to obtain the variable moved, which 
takes the value 1 if the household has moved in the last five years and 0 otherwise. Hence, if a 
household has lived less than five years in the current place of residence, they are considered to 
have moved. The period of five years has been retained because the interval of time between the 
DHS’s data collection is about five years. In the sample used, around 10% of the population in 
each database had moved in the last five years. 
Nonetheless, after merging the household members dataset with the individual dataset, which 
contains mothers, the sample is restricted to children under 11 years old in 2001. It is not possible 
then to consider older cohort A as a control group. This could be explained by the fact that the 
individual dataset is limited to women between 15 and 49 years old. As a result, it is difficult to 
find mothers for older cohorts of birth. Moreover, the variable on migration is only available in 
the individual dataset. It reduces the choice of datasets to use to build the databases for the 
estimates. However, it is important to check that the impacts noted in the main evaluation are not 
due to the effect of migration. Consequently, the solution was to use the middle cohort (aged 9 to 
11) as a control group here. These estimates should be regarded with caution because the middle 
cohort could benefit from the FPE policy. In fact, children aged nine to 11 are eligible for FPE as 
well as children of the younger cohort (aged 6 to 8). As a result, the comparison might be biased 
because both groups are treatment groups. Yet, the main idea of the robustness check is to show 
that the results are not drastically different when migration is considered. Moreover, only the 
medium-term evaluation is controlled for robustness, because the sample is the most complete 
over the medium-term. 
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Table 13: Impacts of the FPE policy on current enrollment in the medium-term with migration 
(DHS 2001/2006) 
 Girls in rural areas Girls in urban areas 
 Full sample Reduced 
sample 
Full sample Reduced 
sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Current enrollment     
Treatment sample: individuals aged 6 to 8 in 2001 or 
11 to 13 in 2006 
Control: individuals aged 9 to 11 in 2001 or 14 to 16 in 
2006 
    
     
2006 dummy 1.508*** 1.629*** 1.370*** 1.471*** 
 (0.282) (0.309) (0.240) (0.253) 
Younger cohort 0.184** 0.221** 0.204*** 0.166** 
 (0.0760) (0.0884) (0.0636) (0.0702) 
Younger cohort* 2006 dummy -0.215** -0.248** -0.205*** -0.163** 
 (0.0843) (0.0966) (0.0713) (0.0775) 
Dummy for rural areas -0.0340 -0.0138 -0.0860* -0.141** 
 (0.0610) (0.0647) (0.0520) (0.0584) 
Dummy for rural areas * 2006 dummy -0.104 -0.122* 0.0189 0.0991 
 (0.0687) (0.0727) (0.0599) (0.0642) 
Younger cohort*Dummy for rural areas -0.0906 -0.114 -0.0673 0.00709 
 (0.0687) (0.0766) (0.0595) (0.0665) 
Younger cohort* Dummy for rural areas*2006 dummy 0.149* 0.168** 0.0826 -0.0115 
 (0.0770) (0.0844) (0.0655) (0.0725) 
     
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.232 -0.351 -0.103 -0.359 
 (0.232) (0.258) (0.204) (0.218) 
Pseudo R2 3,552 3,277 4,316 3,989 
Observations 0.205 0.205 0.204 0.176 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. The equations include other control variables on the head of household’s age, gender 
and education level, the child’s age, the number of children under five years old, districts’ dummies and 
dummies for the quintiles of wealth, which are not presented. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2001 and 2006 
 
The results in Table 13 have been obtained from estimates of Equation 1 on a restricted sample. 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 13 correspond to estimates with the full sample. Columns 2 and 4 are 
the results of estimates of current enrollment with the restricted sample. The restricted sample 
excludes households that have moved in the last five years. Table 13 shows quite similar impact 
on current enrollment of children in rural areas with both the full and restricted samples. There is 
only a difference of two percentage points for the probability of current enrollment of girls in 
rural areas, but the program still has an impact. Therefore, the FPE policy had a real affect on the 
treatment group. The influence of the program is not due to potential migration.  
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In summary, the robustness checks confirmed the results of the main evaluation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper intends to measure the impact of the FPE policy on the schooling of girls in the 
short- and medium-term in Benin (West Africa). The evaluation of this natural experiment takes 
advantage of several variations: birth cohorts, area of residence and time. The treatment group is 
girls living in rural areas who are eligible to be enrolled in primary school.  
Essentially, the evaluation raises three interesting points. First, the elimination of fees 
significantly increased the probability of current enrollment of the beneficiaries by 11% in the 
short-term and 13% in the medium-term. The policy influenced all levels of wealth, but the 
impact is more pronounced on the wealthiest households in the short-term.  As a result, wealth 
was a key determinant of current enrollment in the short-term. In the medium-term, the 
differences in wealth dwindled. Second, the FPE policy has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of dropping out and years of schooling for girls in rural areas. Consequently, 
attendance might be more influenced by other educational costs. Essentially, the policy has no 
impact on attendance, but the distance to school does have an effect. These results suggest the 
indirect costs (e.g.. transportation fees) might be better determinants of schooling decisions than 
direct costs. Third, the FPE policy increased the probability of dropout by boys in rural areas in 
the short-term. It is a drawback of the policy. In the medium-term, this effect disappeared. 
Households are constrained by their wealth. It is understandable that in the short-term, when 
enrollment still depends on wealth, that boys would be affected by the policy. The different 
robustness checks support the impact evaluation.  
This study supports the idea that children's enrollment, and especially girls’ demand for 
education, is responsive to the price of education (Glick, 2008; Iṡçan et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
it is necessary to make sure that the policy does not affect boys in the same areas negatively. 
Most important, this experiment indicates that abolition of direct educational costs may not be a 
sufficient reason for girls in rural areas to complete primary school. This result agrees with 
previous work by Lucas and Mbiti (2012). Fees are potential barriers to education, but other 
factors could also explain attendance issues. Future work should analyze in depth the impact of 
the opportunity and indirect costs on children's attendance. Indeed, the national investment in 
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enrolling girls could be negligible if girls do not complete primary school. This paper suggests 
that the abolition of school fees is beneficial for education and should be generalized. However, 
the government should subsidize other educational costs and build schools to improve attendance. 
One of the main limitations of this paper is the lack of data on actual educational costs. Indeed, 
the evaluation could not cover the extent of the cost reduction. In addition, data on school 
facilities, pupil performance, and community infrastructure would have allowed a thorough 
examination of supply-side factors. However, none of these limitations lessen the validity of the 
results.  
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Chapter 2: Impact of a Demand-and-Supply Side Policy on Girls’ 
Schooling in Benin, West Africa 
  
Mafaïzath Fatoké Dato* 
Abstract 
The present article argues that a demand-and-supply policy could be more beneficial for Sub-
Saharan African countries. Indeed, the removal of direct costs might encourage parents to send 
their children to school, but the decision to continue could depend on the distance to school, the 
qualification of the teachers, or the school’s equipment. This paper measures the impact of such a 
policy in Benin, West Africa. This country has introduced a program to eliminate school fees, 
build schools and recruit teachers in 2006. The data used come from the Benin Demographic and 
Health Surveys of 2006 and 2012. The difference-in-differences estimations reveal that the policy 
has increased enrollment and attendance of birth cohorts of children eligible for the program. 
Children stayed in average two more years in primary schools following the implementation of 
the program. Nevertheless, the gender disparities are still persistent.  
Keywords: Policy evaluation, Education, Gender, Inequality. 
JEL classification: H43, I24, I25, I28 
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1. Introduction 
Several developing countries implemented an elimination of school fees in primary education to 
reach the Millennium Development Goal 2 (MDG2). However, these programs neglect the poor 
study conditions in these countries. A report from Education for All Global Monitoring reveals 
that 250 million children are not learning the basics in primary school due to the quality of the 
school systems (UNESCO, 2014). In some rural settings, the closest school is some considerable 
distance away. In others, schools lack fundamental pedagogical equipment. Glick (2008) 
informed that the fragile schooling conditions have a stronger negative impact on girls than boys, 
which may indeed widen the gender differences in schooling in developing countries.  
Despite the tremendous accomplishment for primary enrollment, more work needs to be done to 
examine the issues around years of schooling completed and gender inequalities. This article 
argues that a demand-and-supply side policy could be beneficial for children’s years of schooling 
completed, especially for girls’. This policy is a program that affects both the demand and supply 
sides of education. It could be an elimination of school fees and an expansion of schools’ 
infrastructure. Indeed, the removal of direct costs may encourage parents to send their children to 
school, but the decision to continue could depend, for instance, on the distance to school, the 
qualification of the teachers, the class size or the school’s equipment. The lack of basic 
equipment for the classroom or the absenteeism of teachers may inhibit the child’s ability to learn 
and eventually discourage the child from remaining in school (Glewwe and Jacoby (1994), 
Michaelowa (2001), Glick and Sahn (2006), Orazem and King (2008); Frölich and Michaelowa 
(2011)). Demand-and-supply side policies are usually costly, even though the national budgets of 
developing countries are often restricted. Considerable funds could be lost in enrolling children 
who do not complete their primary education. 
On the one hand, school fees partly determine the parents’ choice to provide an education for 
their children in developing countries. This relationship has been evaluated through natural or 
randomized experiments on the removal of school fees (Ranasinghe and Hartog (2002), 
Deininger (2003), Lincove (2012), Lucas and Mbiti (2012)). On the other hand, numerous studies 
have examined policies aimed at the improvement of supply-side factors in primary schools. A 
large school expansion program in Indonesia increased the number of years of schooling, as well 
as the earnings of individuals exposed at different degrees (Duflo, 2001). Chin (2005) also found 
that a redeployment of teachers across schools in India increases primary school completion more 
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for girls than boys. Handa (2002) found in Mozambique that raising adult literacy or building 
schools has more of an impact on schooling than the increase of household wealth. Nonetheless, 
only a few empirical studies have analyzed the impact of a combined demand-and-supply side 
policy in a developing country. Thus, the present study has a unique opportunity to assess the 
impact of such program in Benin, a Sub-Saharan African country.  
This research considers the case of the Free Primary Education (FPE) of 2006 in Benin, which 
is a major demand-and-supply side policy. In this country, the government declared primary 
education to be free in October 2006. The decision coincided with an expansion in schools’ 
infrastructure through the recruitment of teachers and the construction of schools. The data come 
from the Benin Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 2006 and 2012. The National 
Institute for Statistics (INSAE) provides the data in collaboration with Macro International. The 
paper uses the method of double differences on birth cohorts to assess the impact of the FPE on 
schooling. Children eligible for the FPE are children of primary school-going age. Hence, the 
birth cohorts of individuals no more registered in primary schools are used as control groups for 
the evaluation. The estimations take advantage of the fact that the post-treatment year is five 
years after the launch of the program. Thus, it is possible to measure the medium term impacts on 
attendance. This research also distinguishes in the sample of children: the ones previously 
enrolled and, the ones never enrolled. It allows a proper investigation of children's attendance 
after the FPE. In other words, did children stay longer in schools following the policy? After the 
evaluation, the study uses different heterogeneity analysis to explain the gender disparities. 
Indeed, the preference for boys’ schooling over girls might be explained by the household’s 
wealth or the school infrastructure. A placebo experiment, on birth cohort not eligible for the 
program, confirmed the different results 
The contributions of this research are threefold. This article is one of the first evaluations of the 
demand-and-supply policy in Benin. It exposes the effects of the policy on gender and wealth 
disparities in schooling. The paper also examines the influence of the school infrastructure on 
enrollment and attendance. The article’s structure is as follows: section 2 presents the policy, 
section 3 covers the methodology, section 4 discloses the results on current enrollment, section 5 
displays the results on attendance, section 6 reveals the robustness check and section 7 concludes.  
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2. The context of primary education in Benin  
On October 14, 2006, Benin launched the second Free Primary Education (FPE) policy. On the 
demand side, the government removed school fees for every child of school-going age. On the 
supply side, the recruitment of teachers and the building of schools improved the infrastructure of 
primary schools nationwide. It was thus a demand-and-supply side policy. This is one of the 
differences with the first policy, the FPE of 2001 (OCS, 2012; Fatoke-Dato, 2015(1)). The FPE 
of 2001 simply covered the removal of school fees for girls in rural areas in primary schools. This 
section presents some evidence of the FPE of 2006, which is the main topic of interest of this 
research.  
The subsequent figures provide an overview of the situation in terms of the number of schools 
and teachers. Figure 4 presents the number of seats per pupils between 1998 and 2011, while 
Figure 5 presents the distribution of teachers between 1998 and 2011. In addition to these figures, 
Figure 6 and 7 give an idea of the regional distribution of teachers and schools on the period 
studied.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the number of seats per pupil in primary schools in Benin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own computations based on statistics of INSAE (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) 
 
Figure 4 presents the development of the numbers of seats in primary schools per pupil between 
1998 and 2011. This result is the total number of pupils in primary school over the total number 
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of seats. It does not consider the different grades at the primary level. It is important to note that 
the primary level of education in Benin include six grades. Yet, this variable is a proxy to analyze 
the study conditions in schools. Overall, the percentage never reaches 1, which would mean that 
each child has a seat to sit on. In other words, despite the growth of the places in schools 
observed, the number of seats is still insufficient. In fact, the rate goes from around 0.69 seats for 
1 pupil in 1998 to 0.74 seats for 1 pupil in 2004. Apparently, no major change occurred during 
this period. In 2006, there is an upsurge of the variable with the value of 0.88 places for 1 
pupil―one of the highest statistics over the period―and could be linked to the expansion of 
school infrastructure with the FPE of 2006. The chart presents a decrease in the number of seats 
after the year 2006. These periods follow the launch of the FPE of 2006 and may indicate an 
overpopulation of primary schools.  
Figure 5 presents the trend in the number of the teaching staff between 1998 and 2012. The 
chart on the left corresponds to the distribution of the number of teachers between 1998 and 
2012, while the chart on the right represents the distribution of the pupil-teacher ratio over the 
same period.  
Mainly, the number of teachers (chart on the left) increased steadily over time, however, the 
chart shows a change in the slope after 2005, which may indicate a slight change in the number of 
teachers. The chart on the right may provide more details on this point. 
The pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils per teacher at the primary level of education in a 
given school year (UNESCO, 2009). It is also a proxy to analyze the study conditions in primary 
schools. The chart on the right represents the pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools between 1998 
and 2012. It shows that from 1998 to 2004, the pupil-teacher ratio is approximately 55. However, 
there is a drop in the pupil-teacher ratio to 45 from 2006 onward. This statistics confirm that the 
number of teachers increased, which implies that teachers were recruited as planned to go along 
with the FPE of 2006. Figure 6 and 7 will give more details on the distribution of schools and 
teachers per region. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of teachers  
 
Source: Author’s own computations based on statistics of INSAE (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
 
The following Figures 6 and 7 present the improvement in the school infrastructure according to 
the different regions of the country. Benin is divided in 12 regions or districts. Figure 6 indicates 
first that there are generally more public primary schools than private schools. The number of 
schools increased steadily over the period in every region without distinction. The rate of increase 
in the number of schools appears to be similar from a region to another. Concerning Figure 7, the 
number of teachers increased also over the period as planned with the FPE 2006. Mainly, there 
are regional differences in term of school infrastructure. However, these statistics are not 
compared with the number of pupils per districts so it is not possible to analyze the study 
conditions per region. More details about these conditions will be given in the results. 
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 Figure 6: Distribution of the number of schools across regions between 2006 and 2012 
Source: Author’s own computations based on statistics of INSAE (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
Figure 7: Distribution of the number of teachers across regions between 2006 and 2012 
Source: Author’s own computations based on statistics of INSAE (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
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These statistics show that the FPE of 2006 considered not only a removal of school fees, but 
also an expansion in the schools’ infrastructure.  
 
3. Methodology 
The section specifies the identification strategies, the descriptive statistics, and the estimation 
procedures. 
 
3.1 Identification strategies 
The main challenge of this evaluation is to identify the impact of the FPE of 2006 given that it 
targeted all children. The solution for this evaluation is to consider older children who could not 
have benefited from the program. The primary school age in Benin is normally between six and 
11 years old. Children older than 11 could not have benefited from the 2006 FPE and are 
potential counterfactuals for the evaluation. The treatment group is thus divided into two cohorts: 
the younger cohort 1 (aged 6 to 8) born between 1998 and 2000; and the younger cohort 2 (aged 
9 to 11) born between 1995 and 1997. This distinction could be of interest because the impact 
may differ for the children who started primary school with the FPE and for those who were 
already enrolled before the FPE.  
The control groups could be any cohorts of children born before 1994. However, the first FPE 
policy of 2001 targeted girls in rural areas and at primary school level. It is possible that this first 
policy has had consequences for children in primary school from 2001 onward. In other words, 
children 12 to 17 years old in 2006 were still in primary school in 2001 and may be affected by 
the FPE of 2001; therefore these cohorts of children cannot be used as control groups. Birth 
cohorts born between 1989 and 1994 are not considered in the evaluation. Hence, the control 
group is children born before 1989 who could not have benefited from either the FPE of 2001 or 
the FPE of 2006: they are the older cohort 3 (aged 18 to 20) born between 1986 and 1988. 
The strategy consists of comparing the educational outcomes of the younger birth cohorts 1 and 
2 with the older cohort 3 in 2006 and 2012. The difference-in-differences is used here to 
differentiate the difference between birth cohorts before the FPE of 2006 and after. Additionally, 
this strategy benefits mostly from the fact that the control group is the birth cohorts who have 
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most likely completed primary school, and are no longer eligible for registration in primary 
school in 2006.  The evaluation is performed five years after the implementation of the FPE of 
2006, and accordingly, it is possible to properly capture the impact on variables such as the years 
of schooling. 
 
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data come from the National Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)8 for the years 2006 
and 2012 produced by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE) in 
collaboration with Macro International Inc. They are nationally representative cross-sectional 
data on economic and demographic information on at least 17,000 households for each survey. 
The sample includes 65,903 individuals from six to 28 years old in order to follow the same birth 
cohorts of individuals in 2006 and 2012. Two indicators are retained to measure access to 
education and attendance: current enrollment and the years of schooling completed.   
 
3.2.1 Current enrollment 
The variable “current enrollment” indicates whether or not an individual is enrolled in the year 
of the survey. Figure 8 presents the density of current enrollment per age in 2006 and 2012.  
It is important to note that the younger cohorts 1 and 2 are between six and 11 years old in the 
DHS 2006, and between 11 and 16 years old in the DHS 2012. Figure 8 essentially shows that the 
proportion of children enrolled between the ages of 11 and 15 is higher in 2012 compared to 
2006. This increase in enrollment could be linked to the FPE of 2006, as it is the birth cohorts 
who may have been affected by the FPE of 2006. The histogram of 2012 starts with the age 11 
compared to the histogram of 2006 because the samples are composed of the same birth cohorts 
but five years older. The youngest children in the sample of 2006 are six years old, yet the 
																																								 																				
8	Despite the launch of the FPE in October 2006, the DHS 2006 is considered to be a pre-treatment survey because 
the data collection was from August to November 2006. The survey began before the launch of the program so it is 
assumed that the impact of the FPE of 2006 in that period is negligible. Moreover, the evaluation considered a five-
year gap between both DHS surveys, because the data for the DHS 2011/2012 were collected between December 
2011 and March 2012.  
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youngest children in the sample of 2006 are now 11 years old in 2012.  Enrollment has generally 
increased in 2012.  
Figure 8: Distribution of the current enrollment, according to the child’s age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
The impact evaluation will provide clarification on this point. Both histograms show that the 
current enrollment decreases with age. 
 
3.2.2 Years of schooling completed 
The “years of schooling completed” is a long-term measure of attendance. This variable 
corresponds to the number of grades completed by each individual in the sample. The primary 
level of education in Benin is composed of six grades. Figure 9 is a plot of the years of schooling 
before and after the FPE. 
One main observation is that male pupils achieved more years of schooling than female pupils. 
It appears that this gender gap has not reduced in 2012. In addition, the chart is left-skewed, and 
indicates that an important proportion of the sample has zero years of schooling completed. This 
is mostly the case for individuals who have never been enrolled in school or who have not 
completed at least one grade of primary school. In 2006, approximately 40% of the sample have 
completed between one and five years of schooling, which corresponds to the primary level of 
education. After three years of schooling, the density decreases. This means that the proportion of 
individuals who complete more than six years of schooling is quite low. The histogram showing 
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the years of schooling in 2012 is similar, however, the proportion of people who complete above 
five years of schooling has increased in 2012. This could be associated with the FPE of 2006. The 
impact evaluation should expose the genuine impact of the program. 
Figure 9: Evolution of years of schooling per gender in 2006 and 2012 
 
Source: Based on statistics of DHS 2006, 2012 
 
3.3 Estimation procedure  
The difference-in-differences estimation is as follows:  
 
E = a1 + a2X + a3X *dummy2012+ a4Cohort + a5dummy2012+ a6Cohort *dummy2012+ v .	
 
with E the schooling decision (current enrollment or years of schooling), the parameters a being 
constants; X the household characteristics, dummy2012 is a dummy for the year of post-treatment 
2012; and Cohort a dummy which equals 1 if the child belongs to one of the birth cohorts used as 
treatment groups and 0 otherwise. The parameter of interest is a6, which gives the impact of the 
policy on the birth cohort. Moreover, the household’s variables are household head’s age, gender 
and level of education, the number of children under five years old in the household and the 
quintiles of wealth. The equations also include regions’ fixed effects because of the disparities 
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across regions. The DHS databases contain a proxy for the household wealth, which is the wealth 
index. The computation of the indicator is standard and based on the household’s assets. It is 
useful to consider the characteristics of different groups in the model, especially when there seem 
to be non-negligible differences between treated and control groups before the policy, as 
indicated by the descriptive evidence (Abadie, 2005). That is the reason why the model includes 
not only treatment variables, but also the household characteristics. Due to inequalities in gender 
and area of residence, there is one estimate per gender and area of residence for each outcome. 
There are two area of residence considered: rural and urban areas. In Benin, an urban area is a 
location with at least 10,000 inhabitants and with at least one of the following infrastructure: a 
post office, an office of the national department of treasury, a water and electricity intake system, 
a health center or a secondary school (INSAE, 2002). 
The current enrollment and years of schooling are estimated with an Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) model. For the years of schooling, as mentioned, over 40% of the sample has zero years of 
schooling completed. Of interest in the evaluation is to determine whether or not the children stay 
longer in school after the FPE of 2006. As a result, the years of schooling have been restricted to 
the grades completed above grade one in order to retain only the individuals who have been 
enrolled and completed at least one year of schooling. This will allow more variability in the 
sample and avoid the results being driven by this important proportion of the sample with no 
years of schooling completed. 
 
4. Impact of Free Primary Education of 2006 on current enrollment  
This section covers the impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment. In addition, the impact 
of the policy is analyzed according to the differences in wealth and school infrastructure. The 
estimations are performed with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, and are globally 
significant at the 5% level of significance. All standard errors are robust to clustering within the 
primary sampling units of the DHS surveys. The estimations also pass the link test of functional 
form of the conditional mean. This shows that there is not enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the conditional mean is correctly specified. In addition, the results tables present 
basic estimations without additional explanatory variables and full models with all variables in 
order to test for a potential omitted-variable bias. The omitted variables bias could come from 
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missing variables in the specification of the model, which would cause a bias in the estimation of 
the effects of policy. In the present case, there is apparently no omitted variables bias because the 
results are roughly similar for both models. The results to consider are those of the full model.   
 
4.1 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment 
Table 14 displays the impact of the FPE of 2006 on the current enrollment of children in rural 
areas. In general, the FPE significantly increases the likelihood of current enrollment, but with 
some differences per gender. 
To observe the gender disparities, the estimations are presented separately per gender. All 
estimations in Table 14 are obtained after the estimation of Equation 1, but with some 
discrepancy. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 14 correspond to the basic models without additional 
explanatory variables, while columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include all explanatory variables. The 
children in the younger cohort 1 are between six and eight years old. The children of the younger 
cohort 2 are between nine and 11 years old. The control group consists of children aged between 
18 and 20 years old. 
In general, the likelihood of enrollment improves significantly more for boys than for girls. 
According to columns 2 and 6 of Table 14, the probability of enrollment of children in the 
younger cohort 1 increases by 35% for girls and 57% for boys in rural areas in 2012. In columns 
4 and 8 of Table 14, the probability of enrollment increases by 8% for girls and 23.1% for boys in 
the younger cohort 2 in rural areas in 2012. The effect is similar for urban areas, where boys’ 
enrollment has progressed more than those of girls, according to Table 15. The gender gap may 
not have diminished. 
It is worth noting that the enhancement of the current enrollment takes place not only for the 
younger cohort 2 but also for the younger cohort 1. The results show that the impact of the FPE is 
more prominent on the younger cohort 1 than on the younger cohort 2. This may lead to a 
reduction of late enrollment, while reinforcing the influence of school fees on the decision to 
enroll at a given time. 
In summary, the FPE has significantly enhanced the probability of current enrollment, but the 
gender disparities appear to be persistent for enrollment.  
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Table 14: Impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment for children living in rural areas   
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus 
Dependent variable: Enrollment         
Treatment sample: population aged 6 to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012 -0.134*** -0.137***   -0.345*** -0.468***   
 (0.016) (0.039)   (0.020) (0.043)   
Younger cohort 1 0.305*** 0.294***   0.046*** 0.082***   
 (0.014) (0.016)   (0.015) (0.017)   
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 0.337*** 0.351***   0.608*** 0.576***   
 (0.020) (0.022)   (0.024) (0.024)   
         
Treatment sample: population aged 9 to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012   -0.134*** -0.094**   -0.345*** -0.418*** 
   (0.012) (0.038)   (0.020) (0.042) 
Younger cohort 2   0.462*** 0.434***   0.290*** 0.312*** 
   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.016) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012   0.074*** 0.084***   0.262*** 0.231*** 
   (0.023) (0.024)   (0.024) (0.024) 
         
Other control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.147*** 0.263*** 0.147*** 0.194*** 0.436*** 0.638*** 0.436*** 0.576*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.037) (0.019) (0.035) 
         
Observations 8,184 8,175 6,403 6,398 8,027 8,018 6,689 6,681 
R-squared 0.226 0.289 0.274 0.339 0.150 0.249 0.174 0.290 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The other variables are the household head’s 
age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, 
dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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Table 15: Impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment for children living in urban areas   
 Girls in urban areas Boys in urban areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus 
Dependent variable: Enrollment         
Treatment sample: population aged 6 to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012 -0.248*** -0.285***   -0.396*** -0.489***   
 (0.019) (0.044)   (0.021) (0.051)   
Younger cohort 1 0.322*** 0.354***   0.100*** 0.147***   
 (0.016) (0.019)   (0.017) (0.020)   
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 0.360*** 0.319***   0.529*** 0.498***   
 (0.024) (0.024)   (0.026) (0.028)   
         
Treatment sample: population aged 9 to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012   -0.248*** -0.244***   -0.396*** -0.398*** 
   (0.019) (0.043)   (0.020) (0.046) 
Younger cohort 2   0.439*** 0.443***   0.240*** 0.274*** 
   (0.017) (0.020)   (0.017) (0.019) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012   0.138*** 0.114***   0.281*** 0.254*** 
   (0.025) (0.027)   (0.026) (0.028) 
         
Other control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.313*** 0.290*** 0.313*** 0.239*** 0.596*** 0.692*** 0.596*** 0.619*** 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) (0.034) (0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.036) 
         
Observations 5,070 5,061 4,530 4,521 4,801 4,788 4,370 4,363 
R-squared 0.260 0.327 0.286 0.337 0.180 0.271 0.211 0.296 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The other variables are the household head’s 
age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, 
dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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4.2 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on enrollment, according to the level of wealth 
Importantly, the analyses do not indicate an improvement in enrollment according to the level 
of wealth after the FPE of 2006.  
Table 16 presents the results according to the level of wealth. Generally, the probability of 
current enrollment increases with the level of wealth in 2012. The results of Table 16 are for the 
younger cohort 2 of children living in rural areas. In the DHS databases, there are five quintiles of 
wealth: the poor households are in the first and second quintiles; the middle class households are 
in the third quintile; and the rich households are in the fourth and fifth quintiles of wealth. For 
presentation purposes, this study considers three levels of wealth: the poor, the middle-class and 
the rich. Equation 1 is run separately for each level of wealth. 
 
   Table 16: Impact of the FPE on current enrollment of children living in rural areas, according to 
the level of wealth (2006/2012)  
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich 
Dependent variable: Enrollment       
Treatment sample: population aged 9 
to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012 
      
Control sample: population aged 18 
to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012 
      
Dummy2012 -0.102* -0.019 -0.123 -0.373*** -0.405*** -0.530*** 
 (0.059) (0.070) (0.077) (0.068) (0.085) (0.073) 
Younger cohort 2 0.380*** 0.545*** 0.459*** 0.306*** 0.350*** 0.299*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.033) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012 0.035 0.021 0.252*** 0.192*** 0.213*** 0.365*** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.048) (0.033) (0.042) (0.053) 
       
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.155*** 0.109** 0.204*** 0.155*** 0.109** 0.204*** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.057) (0.046) (0.051) (0.057) 
Observations 3,427 1,627 1,344 3,632 1,699 1,350 
R-squared 0.282 0.411 0.389 0.272 0.281 0.355 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children 
under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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Table 16 reveals that the impact of the FPE is the most prevalent for children in wealthy 
households. In columns 4 and 6 of Table 16, the probability of current enrollment increases 
significantly by 36.5% for boys in rich households and by 19.2% for boys in poor households in 
2012. For girls, the effect is only significant for those girls in rich households. This suggests that 
enrollment, for girls in poor households, has not significantly changed after the FPE. The impact 
is roughly similar in urban areas.  
These results suggest that the FPE has increased access to education for children in rich 
households rather than for those in poor households. This result is consistent with Kadzamira and 
Rose (2003) in the case of Malawi.  In particular, girls in poor households are left behind because 
parents often prefer to enroll boys in school, to the detriment of girls. 
 
4.3 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on enrollment, according to region 
One main difference between the regions is the schools’ infrastructure. A regional comparison 
of the descriptive statistics indicates that some regions have the lowest number of schools, 
teachers and the highest pupil-teacher ratio compared to other regions. These poor schooling 
conditions may influence the schooling decision of a household. It could be of interest to observe 
how the changes in the regional differences affect the schooling outcomes in these regions 
assuming that these differences have genuinely lowered after the FPE.  
Benin is divided into 12 regions and the heterogeneity analysis takes this classification into 
consideration. The impact of the policy is observed with regard to three categories of regions: the 
regions with “lower” statistics for the school infrastructure (Alibori, Donga and Plateau), regions 
with “middle” statistics (Atacora, Borgou, Couffo), and those with the “higher” statistics 
(Atlantique, Oueme, Zou). The classification considers nine regions because some of the regions 
have similar statistics for school infrastructure's variables used. They were not included to make 
sure that the classification is balanced and will not influence the results. The classification was 
made considering three indicators: the percentage of female teachers; the total number of 
teachers; the pupil-teacher ratio; and the number of primary schools per region. These groups 
should reflect the schools’ infrastructure from the “least” favorable to the “most” favorable for 
education. This categorization has the challenge that it may reflect other characteristics of the 
regions, such as culture. Some regions may be reluctant to school girls or indeed children in 
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general. This categorization also does not cover all determinants of a favorable environment for 
education, yet it is assumed that the groups are homogeneous so that only divergences in schools’ 
infrastructure may appear. Moreover, the distribution of wealth is roughly the same in every 
region, ensuring that the differences observed are not due to any wealth disparities.  
Table 17 displays the impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment, according to this 
classification of the regions. It shows that the regions with the “lower” statistics on the school 
infrastructure have the lowest rates of current enrollment in any birth cohorts. The regions with 
the highest rates of enrollment are the regions with the “higher” statistics on the school 
infrastructure. It could be interesting to observe if there is any change following the FPE. The 
expansion of schools and the recruitment of teachers should improve the schools’ infrastructure 
in the areas with a previously “lower” school infrastructure. Thus, the expected results would be 
an increased improvement of schooling outcomes in areas with a “lower” school infrastructure.  
 
Table 17: Impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment for children living in rural areas, 
according to region   (2006/2011)  
 Girls living in rural areas Boys living in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Dependent variable: Enrollment       
Treatment sample: population aged 6 
to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012 
      
Control sample: population aged 18 
to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012 
      
       
Dummy2012 -0.085 -0.119 -0.124* -0.211* -0.394*** -0.546*** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.06) (0.118) (0.089) (0.070) 
Younger cohort 1 0.249*** 0.263*** 0.335*** 0.110*** 0.0842** 0.137*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.02) (0.033) (0.035) (0.030) 
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 0.226*** 0.336*** 0.364*** 0.407*** 0.526*** 0.567*** 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.036) (0.051) (0.046) (0.038) 
       
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.244*** 0.258*** 0.277*** 0.567*** 0.604*** 0.642*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.054) (0.084) (0.076) (0.059) 
Observations 1,815 2,310 2,733 1,690 2,249 2,707 
R-squared 0.255 0.230 0.312 0.213 0.186 0.249 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, and the number of 
children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant 
at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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Table 17 indicates that the impact of the FPE on current enrollment increases with the school 
infrastructure in the regions. The results presented in Table 17 are only for children in the 
younger cohort 1 in rural areas. The results were obtained after the estimation of Equation 1, but 
on samples limited to each category of regions. In columns 1 and 3 of Table 17, the probability of 
current enrollment increases significantly by 34.1% for girls in regions with “higher” statistics 
and by 22.6% for girls in regions with “lower” statistics in 2012.  
According to columns 4 and 6 of Table 17, the likelihood of current enrollment has increased by 
56.7% for boys in regions with “higher” statistics and by 40.7% for boys in regions with “lower” 
statistics. 
 
Table 18: Impact of the FPE of 2006 on current enrollment for children living in urban areas, 
according to region   (2006/2011)  
 Girls living in urban areas Boys living in urban areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Dependent variable: Enrollment       
Treatment sample: population aged 6 
to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012 
      
Control sample: population aged 18 
to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012 
      
       
Dummy2012 -0.0681 -0.464*** -0.330*** -0.443*** -0.640*** -0.598*** 
 (0.121) (0.0772) (0.0998) (0.148) (0.0942) (0.103) 
Younger cohort 1 0.373*** 0.316*** 0.383*** 0.0957 0.0695** 0.177*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0578) (0.0346) (0.0363) 
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 0.235*** 0.296*** 0.341*** 0.570*** 0.550*** 0.503*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0434) (0.0492) (0.0787) (0.0518) (0.0533) 
       
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.213** 0.506*** 0.444*** 0.677*** 0.887*** 0.778*** 
 (0.105) (0.0620) (0.0747) (0.108) (0.0581) (0.0859) 
Observations 777 1,378 1,285 795 1,333 1,280 
R-squared 0.319 0.313 0.372 0.293 0.255 0.302 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, and the number of 
children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant 
at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
 
In urban areas, the effects are opposite. Table 18 reveals that the impact of the FPE on the 
current enrollment of boys decreases with schools’ infrastructure in the regions. These results are 
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the same for the younger cohort 1. Columns 4 and 6 of Table 18 show that the probability of 
current enrollment increases significantly by 57% for boys in regions with “lower” educational 
statistics and by 50.3% for boys in regions with “higher” statistics. This is not the case for girls in 
urban areas where the effect on girls is similar to the results found in rural areas.  
 
In summary, regions with a somewhat better school infrastructure for education have generally 
encountered more progress in children’s current enrollment than other regions. These results are 
unexpected. Indeed, the FPE of 2006 is a demand-and-supply side policy, which means that 
school fees were eliminated, schools were built and teachers were recruited. The expected results 
are that the disparities across regions would reduce following the implementation of the policy. 
Hence, there would be more of an effect on the current enrollment of children living in regions 
with “lower” school infrastructures, so that the previous differences could diminish. However, 
this is not the case. Results disclose that the efforts on the supply side of education may not be 
enough in rural areas. In urban areas, the supply side investments yield a significant impact on 
boys. Indeed, the regions with “lower” statistics have benefited more from the program than the 
regions with “higher” statistics. This result is expected. Surprisingly, the impact of the FPE of 
2006―according to the schools’ infrastructure―is only beneficial for boys in urban areas. This 
may mean either that the level of improvement of the schools’ infrastructure is not enough to 
enhance schooling for the other groups or that the effects may appear later on. 
 
5. Impact of the FPE of 2006 on years of schooling completed 
This section presents the impact of the FPE on the years of schooling completed. To observe the 
impact on children already schooled, the sample has been limited to individuals that have 
completed at least one year of schooling. The descriptive statistics indicate an important 
proportion of the sample population that has zero years of schooling completed. The sample is 
restricted in order to avoid this proportion driving the results in a particular direction. In addition, 
the purpose of the analysis is to determine whether or not children already enrolled remain at 
school longer following the FPE. The estimations are obtained with the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), and the standard errors are robust to clustering across the Primary Sampling Units (PSU). 
The estimations are also globally significant at 5%.  
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5.1 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on the years of schooling 
The results of the impact evaluation of FPE on years of schooling are presented in Table 17, and 
are only for children in rural areas. Generally, the FPE significantly increases the number of years 
of schooling completed.  
The children of the younger cohort 1 are between six and eight years old, while the children of 
the younger cohort 2 are between nine and 11 years old. Again, the control group is individuals 
aged 18 to 20 in 2006. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 19 display the basic model of Equation 1 
without additional explanatory variables. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 19 are the full models 
including the additional explanatory variables. The estimations are also run separately for the 
younger cohorts 1 and 2. The estimations were performed with Equation 1 on the different 
groups. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 19 reveal that the years of schooling increased significantly by 2.32 
years for the younger cohort 1 and by 2.89 years for the younger cohort 2 for girls in rural areas 
in 2012. The outcomes are roughly the same for boys and girls in the younger cohort 1. In 
contrast, the results are higher for girls than boys in the younger cohort 2. In columns 4 and 8 of 
Table 19, the years of schooling increases by 2.89 years for girls and by 2.58 years for boys in 
rural areas in 2012. In urban areas, Column 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 20, there is a significant impact 
only for the years of schooling completed of girls in urban areas. In the full models, there is no 
significant impact on boys in urban areas. This result is surprising given the previous results on 
children in rural areas. It could be explained by the important differences between urban and rural 
areas in terms of children’s years of schooling completed. There is more impact in rural areas, 
because more changes was needed in those areas, more improvement was essential for schooling 
than in urban areas. 
The outcomes of the estimations suggest that the FPE has significantly enhanced the years of 
schooling completed, especially for girls. The gender gap in the years of schooling completed 
may have reduced.  
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Table 19: Impact of the FPE on the years of schooling completed for children living in rural areas   
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus 
Dependent variable: Years of schooling          
Treatment sample: population aged 6 to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012 0.275** 0.678***   0.616*** 0.196   
 (0.136) (0.263)   (0.125) (0.251)   
Younger cohort 1 -4.205*** -4.154***   -5.561*** -5.510***   
 (0.0977) (0.0999)   (0.0914) (0.0960)   
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 2.500*** 2.328***   2.439*** 2.349***   
 (0.152) (0.157)   (0.144) (0.150)   
         
Treatment sample: population aged 9 to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012   0.275* -0.767   0.616*** -0.447 
   (0.158) (2.420)   (0.136) (0.351) 
Younger cohort 2   -2.882*** -0.390   -4.169*** -4.171*** 
   (0.114) (0.533)   (0.0948) (0.119) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012   2.899*** 2.896***   2.802*** 2.585*** 
   (0.182) (1.025)   (0.157) (0.262) 
         
Other control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 5.926*** 5.430*** 5.926*** 0.230 7.319*** 7.392*** 7.319*** 7.454*** 
 (0.083) (0.182) (0.097) (1.095) (0.074) (0.183) (0.080) (0.203) 
Observations 3,758 3,750 3,168 3,163 4,856 4,851 4,690 4,684 
R-squared 0.452 0.462 0.336 0.367 0.520 0.528 0.426 0.434 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The other variables are the household head’s 
age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, 
dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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Table 20: Impact of the FPE on the years of schooling completed for children living in urban areas   
 Girls in urban areas Boys in urban areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus OLS OLS plus 
Dependent variable: Years of schooling          
Treatment sample: population aged 6 to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012 0.857*** -1.247   2.055*** -0.519   
 (0.150) (2.446)   (0.140) (2.216)   
Younger cohort 1 -5.693*** -1.758**   -6.595*** -0.967   
 (0.125) (0.793)   (0.116) (0.816)   
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 2.323*** 2.406*   1.261*** 1.143   
 (0.184) (1.354)   (0.175) (1.220)   
         
Treatment sample: population aged 9 to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012         
Control sample: population aged 18 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012         
         
Dummy2012   0.857*** 2.924   2.055*** -0.395 
   (0.164) (2.975)   (0.247) (2.415) 
Younger cohort 2   -4.128*** -0.811   -4.818*** 0.316 
   (0.136) (0.663)   (0.135) (0.634) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012   2.804*** 0.937   1.616*** 1.293 
   (0.205) (1.251)   (0.267) (0.998) 
         
Other control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 7.677*** 0.728 7.677*** 0.0789 8.508*** -0.316 8.508*** -1.327 
 (0.098) (1.256) (0.108) (1.377) (0.088) (1.308) (0.139) (1.336) 
Observations 3,317 3,313 3,105 3,101 3,755 3,744 3,638 3,634 
R-squared 0.496 0.530 0.354 0.402 0.599 0.626 0.462 0.514 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The other variables are the household head’s 
age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, 
dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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5.2 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on years of schooling, according to the level of wealth  
In this section, the analyses point to the largest impact of the FPE on children in poor 
households compared to rich households. The sole exception is for the years of schooling 
completed by girls in rural areas. The results in Table 21 are for children in rural areas. They are 
obtained after the estimation of Equation 1 with the dependent variable the years of schooling 
completed on samples limited to each level of wealth.  
 
Table 21: Impact of the FPE on the years of schooling completed for children living in rural 
areas, according to the level of wealth (2006/2012)  
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Poor 
quintile 
Middle 
quintile 
Rich 
quintile 
Poor 
quintile 
Middle 
quintile 
Rich 
quintile 
Dependent variable: Years of 
schooling 
      
Treatment sample: population aged 9 
to 11 in 2006 and 14 to 16 in 2012 
      
Control sample: population aged 18 
to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012 
      
Dummy2012 0.266 0.485 -0.278 -0.00769 0.534 0.0770 
 (0.570) (0.573) (0.784) (0.466) (0.538) (0.675) 
Younger cohort 2 -2.235*** 0.0302 -1.169*** -3.974*** -3.860*** -4.504*** 
 (0.200) (0.205) (0.246) (0.169) (0.215) (0.202) 
Younger cohort 2*dummy2012 2.379*** 2.904*** 3.157*** 3.072*** 2.399*** 1.875*** 
 (0.360) (0.334) (0.433) (0.349) (0.377) (0.435) 
       
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.685*** 1.493*** 3.339*** 7.614*** 7.428*** 8.254*** 
 (0.368) (0.401) (0.455) (0.321) (0.353) (0.333) 
Observations 1,341 1,626 1,338 2,278 1,251 1,155 
R-squared 0.358 0.244 0.241 0.443 0.499 0.550 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, dummies for the region fixed effects, and the number of children 
under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
 
Table 21 displays the results for children living in rural areas and in the younger cohort 2. 
Indeed, columns 4 and 6 of Table 21 disclose that the years of schooling of boys increase 
significantly by 3.07 years for poor households and 1.87 for wealthy households. The effect is 
similar in urban areas. The outcomes suggest that boys in poor households have gained the most 
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from the FPE, and in fact, they are able to attend school longer than before the policy. It also 
shows the influence of the FPE of 2006 on years of schooling completed. Surprisingly, the 
wealth-related disparities in school completion for girls in rural areas have not changed. In 
columns 1and 3 of Table 21, the years of schooling completed for girls in rural areas increases 
significantly by 2.37 years for poor households and 3.17 for wealthy households. The girls in 
rural areas from rich households have gained more from the FPE than girls in poor rural 
households. These outcomes corroborate that girls are more affected by the household wealth 
than boys. It is possible that the FPE of 2006 is not enough to affect the school years of schooling 
completed of girls in rural areas.  
The results imply that the inequalities in schooling by wealth reduce after the implementation of 
the FPE of 2006, except for girls in rural areas. This suggests that the impact of the household 
wealth is potentially more significant for girls’ years of schooling completed at school than for 
boys. However, this is not the case in urban areas where there may also exist other factors like 
opportunity costs or the cultural practices that influence the attendance of girls. It is possible that 
the opportunity costs of maintaining a girl in school are higher than the costs of maintaining a 
boy in school. These topics will be discussed in a future study.  
 
5.3 Impact of the FPE of 2006 on years of schooling, according to the regions  
The estimations per region suggest that the years of schooling increase significantly in every 
region. Table 22 presents the results for children in rural areas and in the younger cohort 1. The 
results are obtained after the estimation of Equation 1 with the years of schooling completed as 
the dependent variable, and on samples restricted to each type of region. The results are similar 
for children in the younger cohort 2.  
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 22 indicate that in 2012 the years of schooling of girls increased 
significantly by 2.97 years in regions with “lower” statistics and by 2.03 years in regions with 
“higher” statistics. As expected, the girls in the regions with “lower” statistics for the schools’ 
infrastructure gained the most from the FPE which implies that the FPE of 2006 encouraged 
girls’ years of schooling completed when girls stayed in school on average two more years. In 
contrast, the boys in rural areas in regions with the “higher” statistics have gained more from the 
policy. In columns 4 and 6 of Table 22, the years of schooling of boys increased significantly by 
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1.50 years in regions with “lower” statistics on schools’ infrastructure and by 2.74 in regions with 
“higher” statistics in 2012. As a reminder, the assumption is that the classification of the regions 
corresponds to the differences in schools’ infrastructure only. It is possible to surmise that the 
level of improvement of the schools’ infrastructure may not be enough to influence boys’ years of 
schooling completed.  
Overall, the results are in accordance with the previous literature that suggests that girls are 
more affected by the schools’ infrastructure than boys (see Lloyd et al. (2000), Huisman and 
Smits (2009)). This could explain why girls have benefited more from the FPE than boys in terms 
of years of schooling completed.  
 
 
Table 22: Impact of the FPE of 2006 on years of schooling completed for children living in rural 
areas, according to region   (2006/2011)  
 Girls living in rural areas Boys living in rural areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Regions 
Lower 
Regions 
Middle 
Regions 
Higher 
Dependent variable: Years of 
schooling 
      
Treatment sample: population aged 6 
to 8 in 2006 and 11 to 13 in 2012 
      
Control sample: population aged 18 
to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 in 2012 
      
       
Dummy2012 -0.729 0.0210 1.027* 1.133 0.227 0.321 
 (0.922) (0.722) (0.563) (0.927) (0.608) (0.504) 
Younger cohort 1 -4.046*** -4.399*** -3.912*** -5.373*** -5.364*** -5.367*** 
 (0.347) (0.264) (0.227) (0.303) (0.283) (0.198) 
Younger cohort 1*dummy2012 2.968*** 2.686*** 2.028*** 1.496** 2.066*** 2.740*** 
 (0.531) (0.472) (0.361) (0.708) (0.464) (0.377) 
       
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.003*** 6.132*** 5.778*** 7.598*** 7.922*** 7.948*** 
 (0.733) (0.434) (0.401) (0.467) (0.384) (0.355) 
Observations 612 947 1,404 776 1,144 1,893 
R-squared 0.490 0.497 0.480 0.598 0.551 0.541 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, and the number of 
children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant 
at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
 
In conclusion, the FPE of 2006 significantly improves the years of schooling completed for 
children already enrolled. On average, children attend two more years of schooling following the 
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launch of the policy. Nevertheless, there are some differences in the impact. The years of 
schooling have increased stronger for children of poor households than for children of rich 
households, except for girls in rural areas. On the contrary, the years of schooling have improved 
more for girls in rural areas and in regions with “lower” statistics on schools’ infrastructure than 
in other regions. The outcomes on years of schooling are different from those on current 
enrollment conceivably because of the limitation to children already enrolled. These results imply 
that demand-and-supply side policy may have more of an impact on children already in school 
because of the improvement of study conditions.  
 
6.  Robustness checks 
The outcomes presented above indicate an improvement in enrollment and years of schooling 
following the launch of the FPE of 2006. The strategies to identify the impact of the FPE could 
be weakened by the lack of appropriate control groups. In fact, the FPE of 2006 was national, and 
the control groups used are the birth cohorts before the implementation of the policy. It is 
possible that the older cohort 3 used as a control group had also benefited from the policy. The 
older cohort 3 is children aged 18 to 20 in 2006. Normally, they are not registered in primary 
school and are thus not eligible for the FPE. It is rare that older children will still be in primary 
school, yet it could be a mistake to not control for this hypothesis.  
One of the ways to investigate the robustness of the results is by means of additional control 
groups. The additional control group is the older cohort 4; the children aged 21 to 23, born 
between 1983 and 1985. A placebo experiment is performed to check that the cohorts are not 
subjected to other policies than the FPE of 2006. The placebo experiment consists of comparing 
the older cohort 3 to the older cohort 4 before and after the FPE. The treatment group is children 
in the older cohort 3 and the control group is children in the older cohort 4. 
The population of the older cohort 4 is likely to be enrolled at the university level. Despite the 
potential low enrollment rates of this birth cohort, the difference-in-differences assumes a parallel 
trend between treatment and control groups. This means that the trend in enrollment for the 
treatment group―in comparison with the control group―would not have changed without the 
policy. Thus, the first difference will remove any disparity in enrollment between the older cohort 
3 and the older cohort 4, and the second difference will give only the residual effects over time.  
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This is the potential impact of the policy. In the case of this placebo experiment, there should be 
no residual impact, because the FPE targeted none of these groups. 
Table 23 presents the results of this placebo experiment. Notably, the FPE has no significant 
impact on the older cohort 3. The estimations in Table 23 are obtained with Equation 1 with 
enrollment as the dependent variable.  
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 23 suggest no significant change in the enrollment for children 
of the older cohort 3 in 2012. The outcomes are similar for every group and for the years of 
schooling completed as well. This means that the older cohort 3 is an adequate control group for 
the policy because children of this birth cohort have not gained from the program. The outcomes 
also indicate that the effects observed on the younger cohort 1 and 2 in the main evaluation are 
genuinely due to the FPE of 2006, because no other birth cohorts have gained from the policy. 
 
Table 23: Linear regression of current enrollment for older cohorts of children 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Enrollment     
Treatment sample: population 
aged 1 to 20 in 2006 and 23 to 25 
in 2012 
    
Control sample: population aged 
21 to 23 in 2006 and 26 to 28 in 
2012  
    
     
Dummy2012 -1.555 -0.400 11.32*** 25.86*** 
 (1.214) (0.283) (2.440) (2.890) 
Older cohort 3 -0.0352 -0.0645* -0.0709 -0.0524 
 (0.0223) (0.0368) (0.0453) (0.0524) 
Older cohort 3*dummy2012 0.0226 0.0354 0.0125 -0.0507 
 (0.0228) (0.0386) (0.0468) (0.0536) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 4.160*** 1.222*** 1.441 -1.591 
 (1.016) (0.253) (1.691) (1.940) 
Observations 4,729 3,650 3,322 3,005 
R-squared 0.200 0.259 0.314 0.324 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU). The 
other variables are the household head’s age, a dummy for female-headed households, the dummies for 
the household head’s level of education, the dummies for the quintile of wealth, dummies for the region 
fixed effects, and the number of children under five years old in the households.  *** Significant at 1%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computations based on DHS 2006 and 2012 
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7. Conclusion  
This study aims to assess the impact of a demand-and-supply side policy on schooling outcomes 
in Benin, West Africa. Mainly, the FPE of 2006 improved enrollment and attendance of children 
in most settings. The probability of current enrollment increased by about 30% for girls and by 
60% for boys in rural areas. The years of schooling completed increased significantly by about 
two years for children already enrolled. Theses results imply that gender disparities did not 
improve in access to education.  
Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis provides arguments for the persistence of the gender gap 
in primary education. First, the wealth disparities in schooling may have diminished in 
attendance, but not in enrollment. There are however some differences according to the gender 
and the area of residence. For attendance, the evaluation is performed on children that have 
completed at least one year of schooling. These parents were able to pay school fees to enroll 
their children. Thus, the FPE of 2006―by abolishing school fees and through the expansion of 
the schools’ infrastructure―allows them to maintain their children in school. The main difference 
with the variable “current enrollment” is the restriction to children already enrolled. In the 
sample, the majority of children had less than one year of schooling. Some children had never 
been to school. The abolition of school fees gave them the opportunity to start a primary 
education. Thus, there might be two levels of wealth involved. Some households were wealthier 
and could enroll their children whereas some others could not enroll theirs. For enrollment, there 
was a difference of wealth that the FPE of 2006 did not reduce. Consequently, the level of costs 
may still be an impediment. It might be of use to analyze the impact of wealth on schooling. 
Secondly, the differences across regions due to the schools’ infrastructure have significantly 
improved for attendance but not for enrollment for girls in rural areas. This result confirms that 
the enhancement of the schools’ infrastructure could be more influential on attendance than on 
enrollment. Despite the removal of school fees, the FPE of 2006 in Benin involved the 
construction of schools and the recruitment of teachers. The improvement of the schools’ 
infrastructure was beneficial for every child, especially children in regions with “lower” statistics. 
After the FPE of 2006, girls in these "lower" statistics regions stayed, on average, more years in 
school than girls in other regions. However, there is no significant change for boys in urban areas. 
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These outcomes imply that the schools’ infrastructure has a prominent effect on girls’ attendance 
in rural areas. These results show that a demand-and-supply policy can help alleviate gender 
disparities. 
Public policies on education may sometimes neglect the supply side of education. This study 
corroborates previous studies on demand-and-supply side policies (see Handa (2002)). The FPE 
of 2006 was successful in enrollment and attendance. It reveals that in developing countries, 
where some remote areas lack schools and teachers, demand-and-supply side policies may be 
more appropriate. There is a necessity to improve schooling conditions simultaneously or before 
the launch of any reform on costs. With the launch of an elimination of costs, it would be of great 
use to help reduce additional schooling costs in underprivileged settings.  
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Chapter 3: Impact of a wealth Shock on Girls’ Schooling and Labor 
in Benin, West Africa. 
 
Mafaïzath Fatoké Dato* 
Abstract 
This research measures the impact of a negative wealth shock on girls’ schooling and labor in 
primary schools in Benin, West Africa. It investigates the prominence of the household wealth in 
households’ schooling decisions, especially on girls’ schooling. In 2010, a devastating flooding 
occurred and affected 55 municipalities of the 77 of the country. The data used are the National 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 2006 and 2012. The identification procedures 
consider three different strategies to capture the impact of the shock: a comparison between 
affected and non-affected households, most affected and non-affected households, farm 
households and non-farm households. The difference-in-differences estimates point out a 
significant decrease in wealth for farm households compared to non-farm households, following 
the wealth shock. The study finds a substantial decrease in educational participation for children 
in farm households. However, there is no significant impact on the enrollment of boys in rural 
areas. The impact is greater on girls than on boys. Enrollment in farm households decreases by 
7.8% for girls in urban areas and 6.1% for boys in urban areas. Robustness checks on other 
different groups, as well as a placebo experiment on non-affected and non-farm households, are 
in compliance with the results. Despite the removal of school fees in 2006, households still 
withdraw their children from school after a wealth shock.  
Keywords: Natural disasters, Education, Wealth shock, Girls Schooling, Child labor. 
JEL classification: I24, O55, Q54, I24 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, numerous developing countries have launched policies to reach the goal of 
Education for All (United Nations, 2014). These policies aim to promote children’s education and 
to decrease gender and wealth inequalities. Despite the remarkable improvement of schooling on 
many levels, the disparities appear to persist. In Sub-Saharan African, a recent report on the 
Millennium Development Goals shows that enrollment in primary schools has more than doubled 
between 1990 and 2012, but that only 23% of girls in poor households complete their primary 
education (United Nations, 2014). These statistics raise the question the household wealth's 
prominence on schooling decisions, particularly on girls’ schooling. 
In this framework, many authors have examined the relationship between household wealth 
and the allocation of the child’s time. In general, schooling and labor decisions are joint for 
households. In critical situations, underprivileged households may withdraw their children from 
school and send them to work (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1993, 1998; Jacoby, 1994). Depending on 
the context, girls could be worse off in comparison to boys. In some areas, the opportunity costs 
of girls’ time are more valuable. Thus, they are more likely than boys, to be dropped out of 
school, to help cope with a shock. There is, however, only a minority of studies on African 
countries. Cogneau and Jedwab (2010) use the cut in cocoa price in 1990 in the Côte d’Ivoire, to 
compare schooling decisions in cocoa-growing families and other agricultural ones. The authors 
indicate a significant impact of parental wealth on enrollment, labor and health. Beegle et al. 
(2006) used data from Tanzania and found that transitory income shocks increase child labor and 
decrease enrollment. However, the household assets may help mitigate the shocks. Also, these 
studies' outcomes are controversial, on gender inequalities. In Burkina Faso, the drop in income 
for food crop farmers in the mid-nineties created a decrease in children’s enrollment and an 
increase in child labor (Grimm, 2011), and the author found a greater impact on boys than girls. 
Kazianga (2012) also found similar results with the effects of uncertainty in the household’s 
income on enrollment and years of schooling completed. Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) showed that 
the rainfall deviations have a significant negative impact on enrollment in Uganda. After the 
elimination of school fees, girls are more often removed from school, to help cope with an 
income shock, while boys are mostly non-affected.  
Consequently, this paper adds to prior evidence on the impact of a negative wealth shock on 
girls’ schooling and labor in Benin. Benin is a small West African country with agriculture as a 
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predominant economic activity. Approximately 47% of the active population works in agriculture 
(INSAE, 2012 (2)). Two types of crops are cultivated: cereal crops (maize, millet, beans, etc.) 
and industrial crops (cotton, groundnuts, palm nuts, etc.). In October 2006, Benin launched a 
policy to eliminate school fees for primary school aged children, (called the Free Primary 
Education policy). Consequently, the gross school enrollment rate increased from 94.7% in 2005 
to 104.27%9 in 2008 (INSAE, 2012). The 2006 Benin Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
indicate that 88.3% of the population among the poorest and 27.8% among the richest had no 
formal education. In 2012, according to the DHS, 56.9% of the poorest and 7.0% of the richest 
had no formal education (INSAE, 2007, 2013). These statistics show that enrollment may have 
improved, but that wealth differences are still observable. In 2010, a major flood occurred over 
eight months in a large part of Benin that caused a costly aftermath throughout the country. An 
official report by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) in 2011 
estimated the economic losses to be around US $160 million. Approximately 680,000 people 
were affected at different levels, and 46 people died. Given the importance of the weather shock, 
the government declared a state of emergency in October 2010 (GFDRR, 2011). 
The empirical strategies of this paper consider the negative rainfall deviation in 2010 to 
estimate the causal impact of wealth on girls’ schooling and labor. The data used are the National 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of 2006 and 2012. This research focuses on agricultural 
activities because of their potentially high vulnerability to weather shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Burch et al. (2008) emphasizes the important conditionality of agricultural activities on rainfalls 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, due to insufficient irrigation infrastructure. GFDRR (2011) also 
categorizes the country in the affected and most affected municipalities. 55 municipalities are 
affected of the 77 of the country. The identification strategies thus consider three potential 
variations to capture the impact of the shock. Theses are differences between affected and non-
affected households, most affected and non-affected, and farm and non-farm ones. Hence, the 
difference-in-differences analysis captures a significant difference in the outcomes of children’s 
schooling and labor in farm and non-farm households after the shock. The outcomes are primary 
education enrollment, children domestic and market labors. An additional outcome is a 
combination of enrollment and labor. Enrollment decreases significantly for children in farm 
																																								 																				
9	The gross enrollment rate is over 100% because older children are considered in the computation. It is an indicator 
of late enrollment.	
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households in comparison to non-farm households. The decrease in enrollment is larger on girls 
than on boys. However, the increase in market labor is greater on boys than on girls. The 
robustness checks control for the impact of the flood on farm households in the affected and most 
affected municipalities. Moreover, a placebo experiment, run on non-farm and non-affected 
households, confirmed the results. The different sensitivity analyses confirmed the results of the 
evaluation. 
The interests of this study are threefold: This research is one of the first evaluations of the 
consequences of flood of 2010 on schooling and labor in Benin. Another interest is that it 
considers the often-overlooked variable, “enrollment and work”. The household can choose to 
send their child to school, and to increase the child’s time spent working in the family business. 
This alternative may not be the best, but it prevents parents from withdrawing their children from 
school. However, this option is only possible when school and work hours do not compete. Also, 
this study uses a gender-based approach to present the results. It enables a further analysis of the 
choice between girls and boys for child labor as a risk coping strategy in case of shock. This 
research contributes to the literature on wealth shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents descriptive data on rainfall shocks in 
Benin, and Section 3 specifies the methodology. Section 4 shows the impact of the shocks on 
schooling and labor as well as the combination of both, while Section 5 displays robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Rainfall shocks in Benin 
This section provides an overview of the rainfall shocks and the consequences of the flood of 
2010 in Benin. 
 
2.1 The flood of 2010 in Benin 
Benin has a tropical wet and dry climate with variations in weather from the north to the south 
of the country. There is a dry and a rainy season, the duration of each fluctuating, depending on 
the different regions of the country. In the coastal region for example, four seasons can be 
identified: two dry seasons and two rainy seasons―one after the other. Given the tropical nature 
of the climate of Benin, the country is subjected to a number of floods and droughts throughout 
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the year. In particular, GFDRR (2011) considers the flood of 2010 to be one of the most 
devastating in recent years in West Africa. This section analyzes the rainfalls deviations in Benin 
during the last 30 years and explains the potential sources of the flood of 2010.  
The national meteorological department, of the “Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation 
Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)” collects the rainfall data from six weather 
stations: Bohicon, Cotonou, Kandi, Natitingou, Parakou and Save.  
The weather stations are representatively distributed across the country because there is one 
station in each main region of Benin. The climate in each main region is quite similar in the 
different areas of the region. These data are gathered in annual reports called “Tableaux de bord 
social” by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE). The database 
used in this section comprises the quantity of rainfall in millimeters per year and weather station 
from 1973 to 2012. Figure 10 presents a scatter plot of the rainfall data per station. The aim of 
this paper is to explain the impact of wealth shocks on child labor and schooling; therefore, it is 
necessary that the wealth shock be a random and unexpected shock. If the shock were expected, 
households would be able to anticipate and take decisions in order to cope with it. In agricultural 
areas, for instance, this could mean making more provisions than usual based on the predictions 
of weather shocks, and in this case, there may be no significant change in behavior. When the 
shock is unexpected, the usual insurance taken by the households prior to the shock may not be 
sufficient. The behavior of households under this constraint is the object of interest here.  
After computing the long-term mean of each series, the differences of the series from their mean 
are calculated to obtain the deviation from the long-term mean. Usually the weather shocks are 
not observed at the same time in different regions of the country. A year of drought or flood 
noticed in one weather station may not be the same in another weather station. This could be 
explained by the variations in the climate of the regions. However, in the years 1975, 1978, 1979, 
2004 and 2010, there were positive rainfall deviations in every region. One remark is the 
difference in intensity of the shock within the same year from one station to another. For 
example, the long-term means of the weather stations of Bohicon, Cotonou and Natitingou are 
among the highest, with 1110, 1282 and 1200 millimeters respectively per year over the period 
1973-2012. In 2004, the deviations from the long-term mean for these weather stations are 
18.78%, 10.25% and 11.04% respectively. Likewise, the weather station with the highest rainfall 
deviation fluctuates from year to year. 
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Figure 10: Scatterplots of rainfall data per station from 1973 to 2012 
 
*The scale is the same for every scatterplot except the scatterplot of Cotonou because its range of data is 
the largest among all rainfall series. 
Source: Author’s computation based on INSAE, 2012 
Figure 11: Line charts of rainfall per station from 1973 to 2012 
	
Source: Author’s computation based on INSAE, 2012 
 
In 2004, the highest positive rainfall deviation is approximately 20% of the long-term mean for 
the weather station, Save in 2010, the highest positive rainfall deviation is 44% in the station, 
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Cotonou. Some caution is necessary, since there is no information available on standards retained 
by ASECNA to define a year of flood.  
The heavy rainfalls of 2010, in combination with other urban management issues, resulted in 
the government of Benin calling for international assistance on October 1, 2010 (GFDRR, 2011). 
One of the specificities of the flood of 2010 is that instead of two rainy seasons separated by a 
dry season, the two rainy seasons occurred successively over eight months. This contributed to 
the overflowing of some rivers such as the Oueme, Niger and Mono from their banks. Moreover, 
the rapid growth of population in cities such as Cotonou was not accompanied by a 
corresponding development of a drainage system for wastewater. In some agglomerations of 
Cotonou, people have built their houses on swamp land which is not stable enough for the 
construction of these homes, due to of the particularity of the soil. These areas are among the first 
to be inundated in the rainy season. All these factors contributed to the flood of 2010. 
 
2.2 The consequences of the flood of 2010 
The aftermath of the 2010 flood was substantial in terms of agriculture and schooling, among 
other sectors. The weather shock affected 680,000 people and 46 people died. 
According to the GFDRR (2011), the agricultural losses were estimated to be 82 billion of the 
local currency the CFA Francs (Francs de la Communauté Financière d’Afrique) or around 
US$138 million (on June 29, 2015). This amount corresponds to farm materials, crops, seeds, and 
farming land destroyed, and cattle lost. The flood overflowed into farming lands and destroyed 
the harvest of many households. Due to these losses, the level of poverty and food insecurity 
increased in farm households following the shock, hence the focus of this paper on farm 
households. Figure 12 provides an overview of the loss in agricultural production following the 
shock. The figure presents the evolution of three major crops in Benin: corn, cereal and cotton. 
Corn and cereals are among the main food crops, and cotton is one of the most important 
commercial crops exported by the country. 
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Figure 12: Development of agricultural production between 2002 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(): Agricultural production is presented in tons.  
Source: Author’s computation based on INSAE (2012) 
Figure 12 indicates that there is a relatively steady growth of the different crops over the years. 
In 2009, there is, however, a diminution in production. For example, corn production went from 
1,205,200 tons in 2009 to 1,012,603 tons in 2010, which is the largest decrease in production 
over the period. This reduction in production could be associated with the 2010 flood. The 
production patterns for cereal and cotton production follow almost the same pattern.  
This change can also be observed in schooling rates. Schools were submerged under water in 
affected areas. This delayed the start of class in certain regions. Most of the schools, constructed 
of poor building materials (e.g. twigs), were completely destroyed in flooded areas. Overall, 455 
schools were damaged. The schools also lost pedagogical materials (GFDRR, 2011). The primary 
level of education in Benin includes six grades. Figure 11 allows an examination of the evolution 
of the Gross Intake Ratio (GIR) in the first grade of primary school from 2003 to 2012. The GIR 
is the number of children registered in the first grade of primary school―regardless of 
age―against the number of children who should be in primary school (UNESCO, 2009). 
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Figure 13: Development of Gross Intake Ratio (GIR) per gender from 2003 to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on INSAE (2012) 
Figure 13 shows a growth of the GIR at a constant rate from 2003 to 2012. There is a decrease in 
the GIR in 2010 and 2011. One observation is that the GIR for males appears to almost always be 
superior to the GIR of females. In 2005 and 2010 however, the statistics are quite similar for girls 
and boys in the first grade of primary school. Yet after 2010, the gender differences return, with 
these years being those that followed the flood of 2010. The impact evaluation could provide 
more insight into the actual impact of the shock. 
 
3. Methodology 
This section presents the data, identification strategies, model and descriptive statistics for the 
impact evaluation. 
 
3.1 Data 
The data used are from the Benin Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2006 and 2012. 
The National Institute for Statistics produces the data in collaboration with Macro International 
Inc. The databases cover at least 17,000 households in each year and are representative at three 
levels: region, municipality and cluster levels. The cluster level is the primary sampling unit of 
the Benin DHS. Benin has 12 regions and 77 municipalities, according to the law 97-028 of 
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January 15 1999. The DHS contains socio-demographic and economic information on a sample 
of households drawn randomly from the clusters defined in the surveys. In order to have 
additional information on the household characteristics, two databases are constructed with the 
different datasets of the surveys: a database of children between six and 14 years old, and a 
database of household heads. The children’s database is then merged with the household head 
database. The final sample covers approximately 45,491 children aged six to 14. The DHS 
surveys of 2006 and 2012 are the most complete and reliable databases available for Benin, 
before and after the weather shock of 2010.  
 
3.2 Identification strategy 
The flood of 2010 is examined as a wealth shock because of its potential impact on the earnings 
of households. It is thus necessary to determine an appropriate channel through which households 
could be affected.  
The influence of the shock may change depending on the household’s area of residence. Section 
2 shows that the amplitude of the weather shock fluctuates from one region to another. Therefore, 
the flood may affect each household in different ways. Hence, a variation in the shock that could 
be used for the identification strategy is the difference in the location of the households. GFDRR 
(2011) pinpoints 55 municipalities as being affected out of the 77 municipalities of the country. 
In addition, a map drawn by the Regional Office for West and Central Africa from the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) categorizes three types of municipalities: the 
most affected, the less affected and the non-affected. From this different classification, the study 
makes two experiments. The first experiment compares children from six to 14 years old living in 
the affected municipalities (most and less affected municipalities) to children of the same age 
living in the non-affected municipalities. The second experiment compares the outcomes of 
children from six to 14 years old in the most affected municipalities to the children in the other 
municipalities. The advantage of these experiments is that they consider a pre-established 
categorization of municipalities according to the damage caused by the flood of 2010. The 
disadvantage is that the sources of wealth are not considered. For instance, certain municipalities 
(e.g. urban municipalities) may predominantly have people working in the tertiary sector of the 
economy. This sector―also called the sector of services―does not greatly depends on the 
weather, where workers are paid regardless of the weather conditions. In the case of Benin, 
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public servants rarely loose their job. They can be moved in other activities or other regions when 
they are no more required in a given sector. It may be difficult to observe a change in the 
household wealth.  
Another plausible variation can be identified in the sources of income of the household. Section 
2.2 indicates important damages for the agricultural sector, especially the serious loss of harvests 
and materials. These damages could influence the household income and its ability to be self-
sufficient. One possible variation to identify the impact of the shock is the differences between 
farm and non-farm households before and after the 2010 flood. This is the third experiment. The 
feature of this strategy is the consideration of the sources of income. In this low-income country, 
households deriving their livelihood from agricultural activities are more likely to be affected by 
this weather shock than other households. For instance, public servants are paid regardless of 
weather fluctuations. The disadvantage is that the DHS databases do not contain enough 
information on the different types of farm and sources of income. There could be a difference in 
the income shock for food crop farmers in comparison to commercial crop farmers. The 
databases contain a variable on whether or not a household owns agricultural land, collected as 
hectares of agricultural land. A household that owns a hectare of agricultural land would likely 
have farming as one of its sources of income. This variable serves as a criterion to define farm 
and non-farm households.  
A potential threat to these strategies is migration. There is a possibility that people move from 
one area to another because of a flood. Section 2 shows that houses have been destroyed by 
flooding, in which case, the changes in wealth to capture may not actually be for the concerned 
households, but for their hosts. The impact may suffer from selection bias. It is thus necessary to 
control for migration. In the sample studied, for about 91% of the children the current place of 
residence is their place of birth. The sample was limited to households that have not moved since 
the birth of their child. The municipality of birth of the children has been considered in creating 
the treatment variable instead of the current place of residence. The treatment variable will be, for 
example, that the child is born in an affected municipality instead of the child living in an 
affected municipality. 
Another potential weakness of the strategies is the comparability of the sample before and after 
the flood. One important assumption of the impact evaluation methods is the comparability of the 
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groups. The suggestion is that the outcomes of the treated and controls could follow a parallel 
trend without the treatment, which is the wealth shock. As a solution, the propensity score 
matching method allows the control of any observed differences between the control and 
treatment groups before the shock. The propensity score matching method has therefore been 
used to create propensity scores for children in the database of 2006 and to merge them with the 
children in the database of 2012. The variable, used to compute the scores, is the treatment 
variable for experiment 1, and the child’s place of birth is one of the affected municipalities.  
Once the different issues are taken into account, the difference-in-differences estimations may 
reflect the impact of the flood of 2010 on the different groups. The following table provides an 
overview of the samples: 
 
Table 24: Summary statistics of different treatment groups after matching 
Experiment 1: Children born in an affected 
municipality 
Year 
2006 
Percentage Year 
2012 
Percentage Total Percentage 
Yes 
No 
14,793  
7,808      
65.45 
34.55 
14,805       
8,085 
64.67 
35.33 
29,598 
15,893 
65.06 
34.94 
Total 22,601 100 22,890 100 45,491 100 
Experiment 2: Children born in a most 
affected municipality 
Year 
2006 
Percentage Year 
2012 
Percentage Total Percentage 
Yes 
No 
8,497 
14,104 
37.59 
62.41 
8,699 
14,191 
38,00 
62,00 
17,196 
28,295 
37,80 
62,20 
Total 22,601 100 22,890 100 45,491 100 
Experiment 3: Children born in a household 
that owns agricultural land 
Year 
2006 
Percentage Year 
2012 
Percentage Total Percentage 
Yes 
No 
15,096 
7,463  
66.91 
33.09 
14,816 
8,074 
64.72 
35.28 
29,912 
15,537 
65.81 
34.19 
Total 22,559 100 22,890 100 45,449 100 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
 
It is worth notifying that the samples in Table 23 are different because of the criterion used to 
retain the treatment and control groups.  
 
3.3 The model  
The main research focus of this paper is to analyze the impact of the flood of 2010 in Benin on 
gender differences in schooling. Yet, the model considers not only the educational outcome but 
also the labor outcomes. In situations of crisis, parents may choose to either send their children to 
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work (to increase the household income), or to keep them at home (to reduce the household 
consumption level). The wealth shock could then influence both decisions (enrollment and work). 
In addition the reallocation of the child’s time in both work and schooling activities could depend 
on the gender of the child, considering the following outcomes: enrollment, market work, 
domestic work, and a combination of enrollment and work.  
In the case of a wealth shock, parents may be more willing to send their children to market work 
instead of to domestic work in order to increase the household income. The market work is 
defined as activities performed by the child in the production of goods for the consumption of 
people other than their family members, for example, work on a farm or in a family business. 
Domestic work is defined as activities performed for the family members such as cooking, 
cleaning and taking care of other family members, see Edmonds (2007). The market job could 
provide an immediate and much-desired supplementary income for the family in a time of crisis. 
In the context of this study, the market work may not be paid, but could provide more satisfaction 
for the household income constraint than the domestic work. This distinction could be of interest 
because the market work could have more impact on school years of schooling completed than 
domestic work. Previous studies indicate that market laborers work on average more hours than 
domestic workers (see Edmonds (2007), Bandara et al. (2015)).  
Moreover, this study adds another alternative, which is the combination of enrollment and 
work. If schooling and work times do not compete, households have the choice to combine 
enrollment and work for their children. This choice could be somewhat more beneficial for the 
children’s learning process than the dropout option. Previous studies also show that the removal 
of children from school―in the case of a wealth shock―could have a detrimental impact on their 
attendance, see Björkman-Nyqvist (2013), Dillon (2013), Maurin (2002). Thus with the 
combination of schooling and work, children could have the opportunity to continue school on a 
regular basis in spite of the shock. Yet, the challenge of this combination could be in terms of the 
skills actually acquired in schools. Children who combine enrollment and work may face more 
difficulties in learning at school because of the labor they undertake in their work. However, it 
could prevent parents from ultimately removing their children from school. In this study, since 
2006, Benin has abolished school fees for children of school-going age. The direct schooling 
costs are thus abolished, and this removal of fees could alleviate household consumption 
constraints. In such settings, the expectations are that the households could continue to enroll 
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their children, or to at least combine enrollment and labor. This hypothesis will be tested with the 
impact evaluation. Consequently, the standard model to determine the impacts of the flood of 
2010 is:  
  
(Equation 1) 
X is a set of child and household characteristics; Outcome represents enrollment, domestic 
work, market work, and the combination of both; the outcomes are binary variables with value 0 
or 1; year2012 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the year is 2012 and 0 otherwise; treatment is a 
binary variable that equals 1 if the child belongs to one of the treatment groups and 0 otherwise; 
the coefficients a are constant parameters; and u is the error term. The child and household 
characteristics are: child’s age, household head’s age, household head’s gender, household head’s 
level of education, the relationship with the head, the number of children under five years old in 
the household, the number of household members, and region dummies. The DHS 2012 data was 
collected two years after the flood of 2010, which is not enough to capture a long-term impact of 
the shock, and may explain the reason for the retention of enrollment as an indicator for 
education instead of the years of schooling, for example. The number of households that own 
agricultural land may be more important in rural areas than in urban areas. Children in rural areas 
could spend more hours working than those in urban areas. This impact may vary among those 
areas. Moreover, cultural considerations of parents regarding girls’ enrollment could be different 
in both areas, and is the reason why separate estimations have been performed according to the 
gender and area of residence.  
The estimations are run with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) separately according to the 
child’s gender. The OLS estimations are used as basis with which to compare further estimations. 
The literature on impact evaluation recommends the use of OLS method for DID estimations 
(Meyer, 1995; Card and Krueger, 2000; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge and Imbens, 
2009; Wooldridge, 2010; Khandker et al. 2010). In fact the DID main assumption is that the 
selection on unobservables is time invariant. It means that there might exist characteristics of the 
participants that influences the outcomes that are not measurables, but these differences remain 
the same over time so that they can be removed over time. This restrict the choice of estimations 
Outcomei = a1Xi + a2Xi * year2012i + a3year2012i + a4treatmenti + a5treatmenti * year2012i +u1i
104	
	
models for the DID to a linear functional form. Thus, the OLS complies the most with the DID’s 
assumptions.  If the model is non-linear, the fixed effect is non additive and cannot be differenced 
out. The estimations results are potentially biased. It explains why this study only presents OLS 
results for the estimations of the different outcomes.  
Table 24 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, and shows 
that 26.61% of children were enrolled, 24.91% combined enrollment and domestic work and 
13.79% combined enrollment and market work. 
Table 25: Summary statistics of the outcome variable per group 
Modalities All sample Farm 
households 
Non-farm 
households 
Frequency (%) 
Enrollment 12,106 6,910 5,182   26.61 
Enrollment and domestic work 11,333 6,760 4,568   24.91 
Enrollment and market work 6,273 5,008 1,261   13.79 
Domestic work 4,012 2,721 1,287   8.82 
Market work 4,766 3,816 942  10.48   
None 7,001 4,697 2,297   15.39 
Observations 45,491 29,912 15,537  
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
As a remainder, a “farm household” is defined as having at least 1 hectare of agricultural land 
while a “non-farm household” has no agricultural land. In addition “none” corresponds to 
children that neither go to school nor work. Edmonds (2007) defines this category as “idle” 
children and states that this is common in numerous household surveys.  
In this research, the flood of 2010 is a proxy for a wealth shock. In an ideal setting, the shock 
could be used as an instrument in a two-stage model to evaluate the elasticity wealth of 
enrollment. However, the proxy of income available in the DHS surveys is the wealth index. It is 
a standardized index computed on the basis of the household’s assets; see Filmer and Pritchett 
(1998). The wealth index could be use as a proxy for the permanent income of the households. In 
this case, the parameter to compute in a model of instrumental variables will be a wealth 
elasticity of enrollment rather than the income elasticity of enrollment. This is not the purpose of 
the study. Thus, the paper considers the flood of 2010 as a potential income shock and evaluates 
the impact of the shock on household reactions. The wealth index is only used to verify that the 
flood of 2010 genuinely is a wealth shock.  
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4. Impact of the wealth shock on child schooling and labor 
This section presents the results of the estimations of the impact evaluation. The estimations have 
passed the link test of functional form of the conditional mean, which is a specification test. The 
null hypothesis that the conditional mean is correctly specified is not rejected. This indicates that 
there is not enough evidence to reject the specification of the models. The estimations also passed 
the global significance F-test, which means that the models are globally significant. The 
standards errors are also clustered in the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) of the DHS, which are the 
clusters. 
 
4.1 Impact of the flood of 2010 on household wealth 
Once the methodology is retained, the impact evaluation can be performed. Before this, it is 
necessary to check that the flood of 2010 actually has an impact on the household wealth. For this 
purpose, the following paragraph presents figures and regressions on the household wealth of 
different groups. 
The sole proxy for income in the DHS Surveys is the wealth index. This index is a proxy for 
permanent income, and may not be suitable to observe the transitory fluctuations in the household 
income. Yet, this statistic could provide an overview of the impact of the flood of 2010 on the 
household wealth. Moreover, the wealth index reduces the number of non-responses or missing 
values on wealth in the surveys. It is approximately between -250,000 and 800,000. For 
simplicity in the analysis, the wealth index is divided by 1,000. The index is not in log because it 
includes negative values. Those negative values become zero if the log function is used, which is 
not the result required. The study would rather consider every value of the wealth index. 
Typically, households with a positive value are either in the middle or in the richer quintiles of 
wealth. The following figures present charts of the household wealth according to the each 
experiment. Figure 14 presents Experiment 1, which is the comparison between affected and non-
affected households. Figure 15 shows Experiment 2, which is the comparison between most 
affected households and non-affected households. Figure 16 shows Experiment 3, which is the 
comparison between farm households and non-farm households. 
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First, Figure 14 indicates that the treatment and control groups, before the flood of 2006, have a 
similar distribution of wealth. Due to the propensity score matching, the groups are more 
comparable. The treatment group is the children born into households in affected municipalities, 
and the control group is the children born into households in non-affected municipalities. The 
distribution is left-skewed suggesting that the majority of the population is in the poor quintiles. 
Only a few households are among the richest.   
 
Figure 14: Development of households’ wealth, according to Experiment 1 (affected and non-
affected households) per year and group 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Second, in 2012, the distribution of wealth seems more equitable than in 2006. The curve is still 
left-tailed but there are more households in the rich quintiles. This does not mean that wealth has 
increased within the population. Rather it may signify that people are poorer but that the 
distribution is more even. The wealth is in CFA francs (Communauté Financière d’Afrique), 
which is the national currency of Benin.  One US Dollar equals 621.55 CFA francs on April 13 
2015. In fact, the maximum of the wealth in 2006 is 756,601 CFA francs (US$1271.27) against 
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370,786 CFA francs (US$596.55) in 2012. There is also a slight difference between the 
distribution of wealth of treatment and control groups.  
 
Figure 15: Development of households’ wealth, according to Experiment 2 (most affected and 
non-affected households) per year and group  
 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
The main difference between Figures 14 and 15 is that households in the most affected 
municipalities seem to have less wealth than those in the other municipalities in 2012. Figures 14 
and 15 also indicate that experiments on the affected and most affected municipalities may not be 
adequate, because the difference in the wealth of both groups is not really important.  
In Experiment 3, the treated are children living in farm households, while the controls are 
children living in non-farm households. Figure 16 shows that the difference in wealth between 
both groups is more pronounced in 2012. The treatment group appears to have less wealth than 
the control group after the flood. Nevertheless, the different remarks on the link between 
household wealth and flood should be further analyzed in the estimations. The estimations of the 
impact of the flood of 2010 on the household wealth may provide more precision on these 
different remarks. 
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Figure 16: Development of wealth of households, according to Experiment 3 (farming and non-
farm households) per year and group  
 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
All these observations are tested with estimations on the household wealth, which indicate the 
actual correlation between the treatment variables and the household wealth. 
A treatment variable to be used as proxy for wealth should have a significant correlation with 
the household wealth. It is thus necessary to determine which variable amid the three treatment 
variables of the experiments―1. a child born in an affected municipality; 2. a child born in one of 
the most affected municipalities, and 3. a child born in a household that owns agricultural 
land―most notably captures the impact of the shock. This treatment variable could then have a 
significant impact on schooling and labor through the channels of wealth.  
The estimations of Table 25 are computed with Equation 1 with the household wealth as 
dependent variable. The results presented in Table 25 are for girls in rural areas. Yet, the results 
are similar for girls and boys living in rural or urban areas.  
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Table 26: Linear regressions of the impact of each treatment variable on the household wealth for 
girls in rural areas over the period 2006-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wealth Wealth Wealth 
Dependent variable: Household wealth    
Sample: Girls in rural areas age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
   
    
Experiment 1    
2012 dummy -1.804   
 (8.386)   
Affected household  -3.433   
 (2.604)   
Affected household in 2012 -2.837   
 (2.749)   
Experiment 2  -2.166  
2012 dummy  (8.347)  
  2.420  
Most affected households   (2.538)  
  -3.146  
Most affected households in 2012  (2.694)  
    
Experiment 3    
2012 dummy   0.397 
   (8.389) 
Farm household   10.01*** 
   (1.924) 
Farm household in 2012   -25.51*** 
   (3.424) 
Constant -1.297 -4.491 4.931 
 (8.088) (7.973) (7.815) 
    
Observations 14,236 14,236 14,221 
R-squared 0.221 0.220 0.178 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include the child’s age, the household head’s gender, number of 
household members, number of children under five years old in the household, and districts dummies that 
are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 26 indicate no significant effect of the treatment variables of 
Experiments 1 and 2 on wealth. Being a child born in one of the affected or the most affected 
municipalities has no significant influence on the household’s wealth. This means that the mere 
classification of the municipalities after the flood of 2010 does not yield enough variation in 
wealth, and cannot be used as proxy for wealth. Consequently, Experiments 1 and 2 are dropped. 
On the contrary, the treatment variable of Experiment 3 has a significant impact on wealth after 
the flood of 2010. Experiment 3 compares the outcomes of children living in farm and non-farm 
110	
	
households before and after the flood. Column 3 of Table 26 reveals a significant decrease in 
wealth for farm households in 2012, after the shock. 
In column 3 of Table 26, the statistics imply that farm households gained on average 10,000 
CFA Francs (US$16.09) more than non-farm households in rural areas before the shock. Yet after 
the flood of 2010, their wealth had decreased by 26,000 CFA Francs (US$41.83) less than non-
farm households. 
 
Table 27: Linear regressions of the impact of the shock on the household wealth over the period 
2006-2012 with Experiment 3 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Wealth Wealth Wealth Wealth 
Dependent variable: Household wealth     
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy 0.397 1.809 11.81 11.08 
 (8.389) (14.20) (8.609) (15.59) 
Farm household 10.01*** 19.94*** 9.723*** 14.23** 
 (1.924) (5.695) (1.736) (5.816) 
Farm household in 2012 -25.51*** -96.40*** -26.68*** -89.20*** 
 (3.424) (7.328) (3.221) (7.749) 
Constant 4.931 163.5*** -14.58** 114.6*** 
 (7.815) (11.72) (6.897) (11.05) 
     
Observations 14,221 7,758 15,532 7,860 
R-squared 0.178 0.411 0.160 0.394 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include the child’s age, the household head’s gender, number of 
household members, number of children under five years old in the household, and districts dummies that 
are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Unexpectedly, the impact on wealth of farm households seems larger in urban areas compared 
to rural areas. The results of Table 27 were obtained after the computation of Equation 1 with 
wealth as the dependent variable. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 27 indicate the results for children in 
urban areas. Specifically, column 2 indicates a decrease of 96,400 CFA Francs (US$155.107) in 
wealth for urban farm households in comparison to urban non-farm households.  
The proxy of wealth used in this study (wealth index) could explain this larger impact for farm 
households in urban areas. Filmer and Pritchett (1998) stated that one of the weaknesses of the 
wealth index is the comparison between urban and rural areas. Essentially, the computation of the 
111	
	
index includes the different infrastructures in the zones. Urban areas usually have more 
infrastructures than rural areas. The index thus classifies households living in urban areas as 
wealthier than households living in rural areas. In this experiment, the flood certainly has 
damaged the infrastructures in urban areas. This can be observed in the decrease in wealth in 
urban areas, but it does not necessarily mean that the impact is significant on farm households in 
urban areas. 
In summary, the treatment variables of Experiments 1 and 2 have no significant influence on the 
household wealth. On the contrary, the treatment variable of Experiment 3 indicates a significant 
negative impact on the wealth of farm households. Therefore, the treatment variable of 
Experiment 3 is used as sole proxy to measure the impact of the wealth shock on schooling and 
labor in the subsequent sections.  
 
4.2 Impact of flood of 2010 on enrollment 
Primarily, the outcomes of the estimations reveal that the likelihood of enrollment decreased 
significantly in farm households after the shock. This paragraph covers the results obtained with 
OLS estimates of Equation 1. The estimations in Table 28 were computed with the method of 
OLS on Equation 1 and “current enrollment” as the dependent variable. Columns 1, 2 and 4 of 
Table 28 presents a significant decrease in the probability of enrollment by 5.9% for girls in rural 
areas, 7.7% for girls in urban areas, and 6.1% for boys in urban areas following the wealth shock 
in 2012.  
The results suggest that girls are more likely not to be enrolled in comparison to boys in urban 
areas. The effect is not significant for boys in rural areas, but significant and negative for girls in 
the same area. This result implies that the flood of 2010 significantly decreased the probability of 
enrollment. 
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Table 28: Impact of the wealth shock on enrollment for children in rural areas over the period 
2006-2012 with Equation 1 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Current 
enrollment 
    
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy 0.091 -0.065 -0.053 -0.087 
 (0.056) (0.067) (0.052) (0.070) 
Farm household 0.036** -0.012 -0.010 -0.028 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) 
Farm household in 2012 -0.059*** -0.078*** -0.019 -0.061** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) 
Constant 0.623*** 0.540*** 0.778*** 0.845*** 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.036) (0.045) 
     
Observations 14,206 7,735 15,506 7,838 
R-squared 0.138 0.160 0.176 0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, household head age, level of 
education, the number of children under five, the dummy for biological child, and the district dummies 
and their interactions with time that are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Finally, one of the main findings on this modality is that girls are more likely not to be enrolled 
in comparison to boys in urban areas. By way of interpretation, it must be taken into 
consideration that according to previous research, the gender-differentiated impact of wealth 
varies depending on the countries. In Burkina Faso, Grimm (2011) and Kazianga (2012) have 
found that the impact of an income shock is more important for boys’ enrollment than for girls’. 
Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) discovered in Uganda that when schooling is not free of charge, a 
negative income shock affects both girls and boys. However, when schooling is free of charge, an 
income shock influences mostly girls. In Benin, school fees were removed in 2006. The results 
indicate that the flood of 2010 affects the girls’ non-enrollment more than the boys’. The results 
of the present research align more with Björkman-Nyqvist (2013). Finally, the gender 
dissimilarities in enrollment persist in Benin. 
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4.3 Impact of the flood of 2010 on child labor 
 
The outcomes on child labor are presented in Table 29. The estimations are performed with 
Equation 1 with the dependent variables “market work”.  
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 29 indicate that the probability of being a market worker increases 
significantly by 9.04% for girls in rural farm households and by 10.6% for boys in rural farm 
households compared to non-farm households. The effect is not significant for children in urban 
farm households. 
 
 
Table 29: Impact of the wealth shock on market work for the period 2006-2012 with Equation 1  
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Market work     
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy -0.095 0.108 -0.609*** 0.086 
 (0.091) (0.086) (0.100) (0.145) 
Farm household 0.035 0.077*** 0.073** 0.211*** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.054) 
Farm household in 2012 0.090** 0.061 0.106*** -0.073 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.060) 
Constant 0.292*** 0.005 0.639*** 0.029 
 (0.071) (0.063) (0.077) (0.115) 
     
Observations 5,226 2,073 4,460 1,490 
R-squared 0.138 0.119 0.335 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, household head’s age, level of 
education, the number of children under five, the dummy for biological child, the district dummies and 
their interactions with time that are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 30 suggest that the probability of being a domestic worker 
increases significantly by 10.5% for girls in rural farm households, by 8.6% for boys in rural farm 
households and by 24.3% for boys in urban farm households. The effect on girls in urban farm 
households is not significant. However, the outcomes on children in urban areas should be taken 
cautiously because the sample has reduced in size, and may not be representative.  
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Table 30: Impact of the wealth shock on domestic work for the period 2006-2012 with Equation 
1 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Domestic work     
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy 0.187* -0.079 0.149 0.124 
 (0.106) (0.111) (0.109) (0.147) 
Farm household -0.005 0.001 -0.017 -0.172*** 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.022) (0.049) 
Farm household in 2012 0.105*** 0.052 0.087** 0.243*** 
 (0.040) (0.062) (0.037) (0.061) 
Constant 0.424*** 0.708*** 0.124* 0.425*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.067) (0.108) 
     
Observations 5,226 2,073 4,460 1,490 
R-squared 0.138 0.125 0.147 0.170 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, household head’s age, level of 
education, the number of children under five, the dummy for biological child, the district dummies and 
their interactions with time that are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Finally, the 2010 wealth shock significantly increases the probability of being a worker for 
almost every child in farm households, except girls in urban areas. The results imply first that a 
potential response to the flood of 2010 for farm households was to increase child labor, especially 
market and domestic work. Despite the shock, cultural considerations remain: boys have a higher 
likelihood of working on a farm and girls of working at home in rural areas.  
 
4.4 Impact of the flood of 2010 on enrollment and labor 
The estimations in Table 31 are obtained after the estimation of Equation 1 with the variables 
“enrollment and market work” as the dependent variable. The estimations in Table 32 are 
obtained with Equation 1 with “enrollment and domestic work” as the dependent variable. The 
method used is OLS. Overall, the likelihood to be enrolled and work significantly increases for 
boys in rural farm households after the shock. 
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Table 31: Impact of the wealth shock on enrollment and market work for the period 2006-2012 
with Equation 1 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Enrollment and 
market work 
    
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy -0.104 0.023 -0.317*** -0.080 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.074) (0.085) 
Farm household 0.035 0.043* 0.125*** 0.112*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) 
Farm household in 2012 0.049 0.066** -0.006 -0.017 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) 
Constant 0.138** 0.035 0.337*** 0.071 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.064) (0.082) 
     
Observations 7,210 4,413 8,839 4,853 
R-squared 0.120 0.119 0.259 0.279 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, household head’s age, level of 
education, the number of children under five, the dummy for biological child, the district dummies and 
their interactions with time that are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 31 indicate that the probability of being enrolled and a market worker 
significantly increases by 6.57% for girls in urban farm households compared to non-farm 
households. The effect is not significant for other groups.   
Column 3 of Table 32 suggests that the probability of being enrolled and being a domestic 
worker increases significantly by 9% for boys in rural farm households. On the contrary, this 
probability decreases significantly for girls in urban farm households according to Column 2 of 
Table 32. This result means that parents could choose to decrease enrollment and work for girls 
in urban farm households, and to increase another type of work, such as enrollment and market 
work. 
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Table 32: Impact of the wealth shock on enrollment and domestic work for the period 2006-2012 
with Equation 1 
 Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable: Enrollment and 
domestic work 
    
Sample: Children age 6 to 14 in 2006 
and 2012 
    
     
2012 dummy 0.114 0.251** 0.099 0.129 
 (0.086) (0.100) (0.074) (0.097) 
Farm household 0.052** 0.042 -0.035* -0.023 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) 
Farm household in 2012 -0.011 -0.069* 0.090*** 0.037 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) 
Constant 0.511*** 0.536*** 0.402*** 0.499*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.050) (0.068) 
     
Observations 8,145 5,327 10,120 6,046 
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.130 0.101 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, household head’s age, level of 
education, the number of children under five, the dummy for biological child, the district dummies and 
their interactions with time that are not presented. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
Finally, the OLS estimates indicate that the probability of enrollment and work has increased 
mainly for boys in rural farm households and girls in urban farm households. These results are of 
particular interest for this study. One of the questions asked by this research is whether or not a 
parent would choose the combination of enrollment and work in the context of Benin. The 
payment of school fees was abolished in 2006, before the wealth shock. With the removal of 
school fees, the budget constraints of the household could be alleviated, and could allow parents 
to choose to keep the child in school or to combine enrollment and work in response to the shock. 
This choice may be less harmful for the children’s education in comparison to completely 
removing them from school. In the case of this study, the wealth shock significantly increases the 
probability of enrollment and work only for boys in rural areas and girls in urban areas.  
This result is in accordance with the results of Bandara et al. (2015) in the case of Tanzania, 
where the authors found that crop shocks in Tanzania increased the likelihood of dropout more 
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for girls than for boys. In terms of work, there is a diversification of the strategies for the 
allocation of the child’s time, depending on the area of residence.  
 
5. Robustness check 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we consider whether or not the results are consistent 
when using other groups of households potentially affected by the flood of 2010. The main 
assumption is that the classification in GFDRR (2011) is accurate. In this case, though the mere 
categorization of affected areas may not yield enough variations in the household wealth, it is 
possible to account for additional variations between farm households. A plausible difference 
could exist between farm and non-farm households in the affected municipalities or in the most 
affected municipalities. The expectations are that the impact of the flood on these subgroups 
should be similar to the impacts observed in the main evaluation. These variations would thus 
reveal the consistency of results across the groups. Second, a placebo experiment on non-farm 
and non-affected households is run. This last experiment provides evidence of any other 
treatment that could influence the groups, other than the flood of 2010. 
 
5.1 Impact of the flood of 2010 on the affected farm households  
Equation 1 has been estimated on a sample of households “affected” by the shock. The 
treatment is still “farm household in 2012”. The difference with the main evaluation is that the 
samples have been reduced to households whose children are born in an affected municipality. 
Two points are important. First, the new samples take into consideration the classification 
between affected and non-affected municipalities. Second, this restriction of the samples also 
helps to control for migration. As seen in Section 3, the place of birth is the current place of 
residence for 90% of children. To avoid a potential migration effect, the municipality of birth is 
used to create the variable “affected”, instead of the current place of residence.  
Table 33 was obtained after computation of equation 1 on the restricted samples of affected 
households. Columns 4 and 8 of Table 33 present a significant decrease in wealth of 
approximately 28,000 CFA francs (US$45.09) in rural farm households in 2012. This decline in 
wealth is more important for the affected farm households than for the farm households in 
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general. Instead of the reduction by 26,000 CFA francs (US$41.83) for a farm household in rural 
areas noted in the main evaluation, the reduction is about 28,000 CFA francs (US$45.09) for 
affected farm households in the same area.  
 
Table 33: Linear regression of the impact of the shock on affected farm households over the 
period 2006-2012  
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
Wealth Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
2012 dummy 0.166** 0.247* -0.167 -3.371 -0.037 0.206 -0.541*** 2.174 
 (0.065) (0.135) (0.113) (10.70) (0.059) (0.142) (0.124) (10.38) 
Affect. farm 
househ.  0.038* 0.008 0.030 10.31*** -0.004 -0.023 0.060 11.24*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (2.282) (0.019) (0.027) (0.037) (2.014) 
Affect. farm 
househ. in 2012 -0.076*** 0.099* 0.097** -28.17*** -0.047* 0.048 0.113** -28.91*** 
 (0.028) (0.050) (0.045) (4.163) (0.028) (0.052) (0.050) (4.260) 
Constant 0.604*** 0.430*** 0.277*** 7.200 0.791*** 0.172** 0.591*** -12.43 
 (0.050) (0.094) (0.086) (9.766) (0.044) (0.083) (0.090) (8.522) 
         
Observations 9,109 3,326 3,326 9,120 9,899 2,813 2,813 9,915 
R-squared 0.157 0.142 0.160 0.188 0.188 0.142 0.348 0.172 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age and the 
household head’s gender. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
In addition, the probability of enrollment also significantly decreases for every child. According 
to columns 1 and 4 of Table 33, this likelihood reduces significantly by 7.6% for girls and 4.7% 
for boys in affected farm households in rural areas. This suggests that the flood of 2010 affects 
girls’ enrollment more than boys’. Further, the likelihood of working increases significantly in 
affected farm households in 2012. Column 2 of Table 33 indicates that the probability of being a 
domestic worker increases by 9.9% for girls in rural areas. Columns 3 and 7 of Table 33 indicate 
that the probability of being a market worker increases by 9.7% for girls in rural affected farm 
households and by 11.3% for boys in similar households. The effects are roughly the same for 
children in urban farm households.  
In summary, the flood of 2010 has similar and even worse impacts on affected farm households 
than on farm households in the main evaluation. Wealth and enrollment has decreased, but child 
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labor has increased. The outcomes on affected farm households are thus consistent with those on 
the farm households.  
 
5.2 Impact of the flood of 2010 on the most affected farm households 
Another variation may exist between the most affected farm households and the most affected 
non-farm households. A second classification of farm households is considered in this case. The 
treatment group is the farm households whose children are born in the most affected 
municipalities.  
 
Table 34: Linear regression of outcomes and wealth for farm households living in the most 
affected municipalities from 2006 to 2012  
 Girls in rural Boys in rural 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
Wealth Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
2012 dummy 0.098 0.319** -0.142 -2.455 -0.093 0.199 -0.469*** -4.567 
 (0.089) (0.159) (0.131) (12.85) (0.062) (0.151) (0.137) (13.19) 
Most affect. 
farm househ.  
0.029 0.024 0.004 14.91*** -0.026 -0.067** 0.166*** 12.07*** 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.041) (2.840) (0.025) (0.030) (0.046) (2.458) 
Most affect. 
farm househ. 
in 2012 
-0.076** 0.049 0.110* -27.51*** -0.068* 0.099 0.005 -21.25*** 
 (0.038) (0.068) (0.062) (5.007) (0.037) (0.066) (0.061) (4.771) 
Constant 0.574*** 0.440*** 0.339*** -4.451 0.808*** 0.196** 0.579*** -14.82 
 (0.067) (0.101) (0.096) (10.61) (0.047) (0.089) (0.111) (10.12) 
         
Observations 5,272 1,955 1,955 5,279 5,900 1,801 1,801 5,899 
R-squared 0.140 0.166 0.191 0.194 0.179 0.134 0.345 0.172 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age and the 
household head’s gender. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
The sample for this subgroup is limited to the most affected municipalities. This limitation also 
controls for migration effects. Equation 1 is run on the most affected municipalities. Table 34 
presents the results of these estimations.   
Primarily, wealth decreases significantly for the most affected rural farm households by 27,000 
CFA francs as shown in column 4 of Table 34. With the decrease of wealth, the probability of 
enrollment diminishes significantly by 7.7% for girls and 6.8% for boys in rural farm households 
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in columns 1 and 4 of Table 34. In terms of enrollment, the impact is still more noticeable for 
girls than boys. In column 3 of Table 34, the probability of being a market worker increases 
significantly by 11% for girls in rural areas. There is no significant impact on domestic or market 
work for boys. A possible explanation is that boys might work in paid jobs rather than unpaid 
jobs. Domestic and market labors are likely to be unpaid jobs, because the children work in the 
households or in the family business. Given the importance of the wealth loss, some parents may 
send their children to remunerated jobs that could yield more wealth. In general, the impact of the 
shock on the most affected farm households is consistent with the impact on farm households. 
 
5.3 Impact of the flood of 2010 on non-affected and non-farm households 
The third subgroup to observe is a placebo case. The samples for this estimation are non-farm 
households whose children are not born in any affected municipality. Once the sample is 
retained, the method used is the simple difference before and after the shock. The linear 
regressions of the wealth in Table 35 present no significant modification in household wealth in 
2012.  
Of main importance here is that the wealth has not significantly changed in either rural or in 
urban areas. After controlling for no significant change in non-affected, non-farm households in 
2012, it is also important to check that the children’s outcome is not influenced by other policies. 
Hence, the placebo experiment is conducted with Equations 1 and 2 to further check the 
robustness of the results.  
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Table 35: Linear regression of wealth for non-farm households living in non-affected 
municipalities from 2006 to 2012  
 Wealth 
VARIABLES Girls in rural 
areas 
Girls in urban 
areas 
Boys in rural 
areas 
Boys in urban 
areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Househ. head no formal educ. -56.38*** -114.3*** -47.71*** -99.92*** 
 (15.84) (14.34) (12.69) (14.24) 
Househ. head no formal educ. in 2012 -14.55 6.300 -40.74** -11.04 
 (19.24) (17.14) (18.66) (19.37) 
Househ. head prim. educ. -33.87** -77.95*** -31.97** -58.25*** 
 (15.66) (15.72) (12.69) (14.05) 
Househ. head prim. educ. in 2012 2.272 28.81 -19.78 13.97 
 (19.42) (18.74) (18.89) (18.31) 
2012 dummy 21.78 23.95 32.29 0.659 
 (20.68) (19.09) (19.67) (27.61) 
Constant 14.90 135.7*** -1.701 121.6*** 
 (13.41) (17.87) (15.42) (18.72) 
     
Observations 1,473 1,091 1,544 1,026 
R-squared 0.250 0.372 0.289 0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary 
sampling unit (PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the 
household head’s gender, district dummies, number of children under five years old in the households and 
the relationship with the head. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
The outcomes in Table 36 were obtained after estimations of Equation 1 with an OLS model. 
Additionally, in all of the columns of Table 36, there is no significant effect in any of the 
children’s outcomes in 2012. Enrollment and child labor have not significantly changed for non-
affected and non-farm households after the flood of 2010. There is no evidence of any other 
shocks or policies on the household wealth during the same period. Thus, these results confirm 
that the impacts observed in the main evaluation on households are essentially the impacts of the 
flood. 
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Table 36: Linear regression of wealth for non-farm households living in non-affected 
municipalities from 2006 to 2012  
 Girls in rural areas Boys in rural areas 
VARIABLES Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
Enrollment Domestic 
work 
Market 
work 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Househ. head no formal educ. -0.223*** 0.097 0.150 -0.237*** -0.183 0.256 
 (0.064) (0.142) (0.111) (0.056) (0.199) (0.227) 
Househ. head no formal educ. in 2012 -0.102 -0.300 -0.390 0.069 0.239 -0.174 
 (0.075) (0.276) (0.262) (0.083) (0.226) (0.228) 
Househ. head prim. educ. -0.139* 0.310** -0.036 -0.104* -0.117 0.245 
 (0.070) (0.147) (0.116) (0.056) (0.229) (0.232) 
Househ. head prim. educ. in 2012 -0.056 -0.344 -0.137 0.104 0.225 -0.094 
 (0.083) (0.289) (0.261) (0.082) (0.251) (0.246) 
2012 dummy 0.054 0.255 0.094 -0.077 -0.072 -0.390 
 (0.157) (0.280) (0.270) (0.102) (0.229) (0.265) 
Constant 0.686*** 0.308** 0.295*** 0.996*** 0.218 0.408 
 (0.107) (0.150) (0.108) (0.069) (0.197) (0.257) 
       
Observations 1,470 514 514 1,541 394 394 
R-squared 0.158 0.233 0.168 0.192 0.174 0.373 
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted robust for clustering across households in the same primary sampling unit 
(PSU). The equations include dummies for the child’s age, the household head’s age, the household head’s gender, 
district dummies, number of children under five years old in the households and the relationship with the head.*** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own computation based on DHS 2006, 2012 
 
In conclusion, the sensitivity analyses comply with the main evaluation. The flood of 2010 
significantly decreases the probability of enrollment and significantly increases the probability of 
work in farm households. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of a wealth shock on girls’ schooling and labor. The wealth 
shock is the devastating flood in Benin in 2010. The impact evaluation points to a reduction in 
wealth for farm households compared to non-farm households. With this drop in wealth, the 
households choose to diversify their coping strategies. First, the flood of 2010 has a greater 
impact on girls’ enrollment than on boys. The probability of enrollment decreases significantly 
by 7.8% for girls and 6.1% for boys in urban farm households. Second, the likelihood to work 
increases more for boys than for girls. The probability of being a market worker also increases 
significantly by 9% for girls and 10.6% for boys in rural farm households. Third, the probability 
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to combine enrollment and work significantly increases. The sensitivity analyses on affected, 
most affected and non-affected municipalities confirm the results of the evaluation.  
On the one hand, the outcomes of this study suggest that the gender gap in schooling could 
likely widen in the case of a wealth shock. Although there are no school fees to pay, the 
households may decide not to school their children, especially girls, to cope with the shock.  Girls 
are more likely than boys, to be removed from school. This could be a valid thread to the 
realization of the Universal Primary Education goal.  
On the other hand, this research implies, that the wealth effect prevails over the price effect, in 
Benin. Even if schooling is free of charge, parents’ reactions to a wealth shock could be to 
remove their children from school. These findings reveal that a reduction or elimination of school 
fees may not serve as a safety net in the case of a wealth shock in Benin. There is the opportunity 
cost of the child’s time at school instead of working for the family. In times of crisis, this 
opportunity cost rises, and the situation becomes more difficult for parents to maintain their 
children in school. 
National and international efforts to reach the goal of UPE could be at risk in Benin, with 
wealth shocks. It could be difficult to acquire skills if schooling is interrupted each time there is a 
weather shock. In addition to the removal of school fees, the main recommendation is to provide 
subsidies to parents in order to maintain their children in school, especially in a case of crisis. It 
could also be an advantage to improve the school calendar by making it more flexible, especially 
for children in rural areas. 
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Appendix paper 3: Map of Benin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source : OCHA/ http://reliefweb.int/map/benin/benin-classification-des-communes-
sinistr%C3%A9es-18-october-2010 
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Synopsis (Part 2) 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the determinants of the gender gap in schooling in 
Benin, West Africa. This country has launched several policies aimed at improving the level of 
education and decreasing the gender disparities. However, national statistics indicate inequalities 
between girls and boys in schooling, especially in attendance. This dissertation proposes three 
arguments to explain these gender inequalities: schooling costs, schools’ infrastructures, and 
households’ wealth. This synopsis presents the evidence to support the arguments, the policy 
recommendations and the limitations of the dissertation. 
Policies that eliminate school fees may disregard residual schooling costs. These residual 
schooling costs are the indirect and opportunity costs, which could be higher than the direct 
school fees. It could explain that in spite of the removal of school fees, boys are often chosen for 
registration in schools to the detriment of girls. The first case study thus analyzes the impact of 
the removal of school fees for girls in rural areas on their schooling. It is the Free Primary 
Education policy of 2001. The estimations suggest that the removal of school fees improves 
enrollment for girls and not boys. This outcome advocates that girls’ schooling is indeed price 
responsive, in concordance with the literature on the gender gap in schooling (see Glick and Sahn 
(2000), Glick (2008)). The results also conform to the empirical literature on the impact of user 
fees elimination (see Deininger (2003), Lincove (2009 and 2012), Lucas and Mbiti (2012)). 
Second, the estimations also show that the distance to school as a proxy for the residual schooling 
costs influences both enrollment and attendance. The results confirm the existence of residual 
schooling costs. They are a potential hindrance for girls' schooling in Benin. 
The poor schooling conditions in some developing countries could also explain the low 
attendance of girls in primary school over boys. In a second case study, the evaluation of a 
demand-and-supply policy indicates a significant increase in enrollment greater for boys than 
girls. The demand-and-supply policy is an elimination of school fees and an upgrading of the 
schools’ infrastructure at the primary level of education. This policy is the FPE of 2006. In 
contrast to the FPE of 2001, the FPE of 2006 has a greater impact on boys’ enrollment than girls’. 
This means that programs focusing on the education of girls could be beneficial in the reduction 
of the gender gap in schooling. This result also complies with the previous empirical literature on 
the gender gap in education (see Glick (2008), Schady and Filmer (2006), and Lincove (2009, 
2012)). Nevertheless, the gender inequalities do not seem to have reduced in enrollment with the 
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FPE of 2006; if there are no school fees to be paid―regardless of gender―boys are often chosen 
for schooling over girls. It indicates that other considerations, such as culture, could also 
influence household decisions to school a child in Benin. This result complies with Colclough et 
al. (2000). The second case assesses the impact of the FPE of 2006 on attendance of children 
schooled already in primary education. The estimations results show a significant increase in 
years of schooling, greater for girls than boys. The gender inequalities in the attendance of 
primary school could be diminishing. In the sample, children stay in school two more years on 
average. Girls, in particular, stay longer in school than boys.  In contrast to the FPE of 2001 that 
had an impact solely on enrollment, the FPE of 2006 has an impact on enrollment and attendance. 
These results could have two explanations. On the one hand, the upgrading of the schools’ 
infrastructure in the FPE of 2006 could be an explanation for the difference in the results and 
confirms previous literature on the effect of the schools’ infrastructure on schooling (Michaelowa 
(2001), Lloyd et al. (2000), Chin (2005), Duflo (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2007), Frölich and 
Michaelowa (2011)). It confirms that schools’ infrastructures were indeed a hindrance to girls’ 
attendance in primary school in Benin. On the other hand, the FPE of 2006 removes school fees 
and reduces the distance to school. The overall schooling costs have reduced more with the FPE 
of 2006 than with the FPE of 2001. It could also explain the difference in the outcomes of both 
policies. Finally, a demand-and-supply policy could also have a beneficial impact on the 
reduction of the gender gap in education. 
The third case study of this dissertation investigates the impact of household wealth on the 
gender inequalities in schooling. The FPE of 2001 and 2006 do not consider the major role of 
wealth in households' schooling decisions. Households' wealth will be determinant in girls' 
schooling decisions, as long as there are residual costs. This article thus argues that a wealth 
shock could be a valid threat to the efforts engaged in the reduction of the gender gap in 
schooling. The estimations outcomes show a significant decrease in enrollment for children 
affected by a wealth shock. The results are in concordance with the literature on impacts of 
income shocks (Beegle et al. (2006), Cogneau and Jedwab (2010), Grimm (2011), and Kazianga 
(2012), Günther and Harttgen (2009)). The effect of the shock is stronger on girls than on boys. 
This result implies that the gender gap in schooling may be worsening due to wealth shocks. This 
outcome complies with the results of Björkman-Nyqvist (2013). 
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The recommendations for policymakers include three points: schooling costs, infrastructures, 
and households' wealth. The overall costs should be removed―not only the school fees. The 
financial resources conceivably restrain governments in the promotion of education. Stakeholders 
and governments should invest in promoting children's primary education achievement. First, this 
dissertation proposes that the government reduces the indirect and opportunity costs of schooling 
instead of the direct ones. The indirect and opportunity costs could be higher than the direct ones, 
thus, may have more impact on schooling than the school fees. When public authorities cannot 
afford to remove all schooling costs, they can improve schools' infrastructures (a reduction of 
transportation fees); they can provide pedagogical materials or uniforms (a reduction of indirect 
costs); they can also offer alternatives to child labor (a reduction of the opportunity costs). A 
potential alternative to child labor could be to provide financial assistance to households in the 
case of a wealth shock so they will not use child labor as a coping strategy. The dissertation 
provides evidence that the removal of fees, the construction of schools and the recruitment of 
teachers are useful for the reduction of the gender gap in schooling; and this program should be 
sustained. Several reforms can help improve the schools infrastructures: the renovation and 
increase of schools, the implementation of feeding programs, the recruitment of female teachers, 
and the introduction of school buses. Second, this dissertation suggests additional gender-targeted 
policies to encourage girls' schooling, in the case of a generalization of FPE for every child. It is 
crucial that these gender-related policies be not only based on the school costs but also on other 
incentives for girls’ schooling. A plausible gender-targeted policy could be a scholarship for 
children in poor households, but with a greater number of scholarships available for girls than 
boys. Another possibility could be a cash transfer, for the schooling of two girls and one boy in 
the same household. 
This dissertation was limited mostly by the data available. Up to the time of writing, there are 
no existing surveys for the FPE. The alternative was to use the DHS.    They are the best option 
because the surveys are nationally representative of the population.  However, the surveys have a 
time gap of five years, which provides an additional challenge for the impact evaluations. 
Furthermore, the DHS surveys are more focused on health issues. Hence, the information on 
schools, classrooms, study conditions and scores is lacking. One recommendation of the 
dissertation is the investment in surveys on education, in particular on educational policies. It is 
also important that the information gathered at the administrative level be centralized and fully 
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available to the public. Some information on education is available in the “Programme d’Analyse 
des Systemes Educatifs et de la CONFENEM (PASEC)” survey of Benin in 2005. However, there 
is no post-treatment survey yet to allow an evaluation of the impact on children’s performance in 
primary school. It will be a topic for future research. Another interesting topic is the impact of the 
reform on fertility and early marriage. Indeed, the programs improved schooling, especially for 
girls. The change in education could affect fertility choices. 
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